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INTRODUCTION
Each year, millions of transactions involving the purchase and sale
of securities take place. Occasionally, disagreements develop over
these transactions. Many of these disputes are then resolved by
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arbitration, the voluntary submission of a dispute to an impartial party
for final and binding determination.'
A controversy exists over the arbitrability of securities claims due to
the conflicting policies2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration
Act)3 passed in 1925, and the federal securities laws, passed in 1933
and 1934.1 Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act)5 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),6 in
response to the rampant speculation, fraud, and deception in the
securities industry that had culminated in the stock market crash of
1929.7 Although the Securities Act and the Exchange Act differ,'
they share common goals. The federal securities laws were created
with two main purposes: (1) to protect investors by elevating their
level of sophistication through the requirement of full disclosure
regarding investments; and (2) to restore investor confidence in the
securities markets by instilling trust in their efficient and honest
operation. 9
1. See generally INTERNATIONAL CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. ARBITRATION ASSN,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES (1993) (defining arbitration agreements).
2. SeeMichael Durrer, EnforcingArbitration of Federal Securities Law Claims: TheEffect ofDean
Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 28 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 335, 340 (1987) (explaining competing policies
of efficient dispute resolution through arbitration and investor protection of securities laws); see
also GEORGE FRIEDMAN, ARBITRATING YOUR CASE UNDER THE SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 4 (1993) (discussing conflict between Securities Acts
promise of private right of action in courts and predispute arbitration agreements in which
participants waive right to proceed in court).
3. Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (1994)).
4. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-
77bbbb (1994)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Star. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994)).
5. Ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1994)).
6. Ch. 404, § 1, 48 Star. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994)). The
Exchange Act was created primarily to protect investors from manipulation of stock prices on
the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets. SeeMichael D. Hool, Whos Protecting Investors?
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), Compels Private Claims Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act into Arbitration, 19 Amiz. ST. LJ. 793, 795 (1987).
Congress provided for both civil and criminal remedies under the Exchange Act. Id.
7. SeeShearson/American Express Inc.v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,251 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (explaining historical development of securities laws).
8. SeeDurrer, supra note 2, at 336 n.6. The Exchange Act primarily regulates post-issuance
securities trading that encompasses the majority of investor disputes. Id. The Securities Act, on
the other hand, regulates the initial issuance of securities. Id. The majority of investors sue
under the Exchange Act, although when a dispute arises during an initial public offering, the
affected investors have a cause of action under the Securities Act. Id. Investors will also sue
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, because it covers
many fraudulent acts connectedwith investments. Id. Frequently, both Acts provide alternative
remedies. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (allowing parties
to maintain § 10(b) action under Exchange Act even though they had express remedy under
§ 11 of the Securities Act).
9. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387 (articulating twin aims of federal securities
laws).
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The Arbitration Act, alternatively, created a method by which
securities disputes could be settled quickly, fairly, and inexpensive-
ly.1 The Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate not just existing, but also future, disputes relating
to transactions involving interstate commerce." In this manner,
arbitration agreements reached by parties, before and after a dispute
arises, are enforceable. The Arbitration Act was intended to reverse
centuries of judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements by
providing for their enforcement to the same extent as other con-
tracts. 2 Additionally, the Arbitration Act was created to reduce
congestion in the courts by offering parties an equivalent substitute
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994). A typical arbitration suit arises after parties have been unable
to resolve a dispute and one party files a Demand for Arbitration. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSN,
A GUIDE FOR SECURITIES ARBITRATORS 9 (1993). A Demand for Arbitration functions like a court
complaint by notifying the other party of the desire to arbitrate the dispute pursuant to a
contractual agreement reached by the parties. Id. This agreement gives the arbitral forum
authority over the suit. The responding party then has 20 days to assert an answer or
counterclaim. NASD Rules § 13(d). An assigned case administrator will send a letter to the
parties acknowledging receipt of the Demand and enclose a list of potential arbitrators from
which the parties are to choose. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 18. The arbitrators, once selected,
will administer a limited discovery process prior to the presentation of any testimony or
evidence. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 16-17. At the hearing, arbitrators have control over the
order and direction of the informal proceedings and are not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. NASD Rules § 34. The arbitration rules grant the arbitrators broad authority to deny
the admission of evidence while allowing them immense subpoena power. FRIEDMAN, supra note
2, at 18. Arbitration procedures resemble court proceedings in several ways. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 2, at 18. First, each side makes an opening statement, testimony is taken, witnesses are
cross-examined, and the evidence is introduced. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 18. Second, the
rules give parties an absolute right to be represented by counsel, and require that a record be
kept for all hearings. NASD Rules §§ 27, 37. The cost of transcription, however, is borne by
the requesting party. I.
After the hearing, the arbitrators move to deliberations. During this stage, they discuss their
opinions on the issues while considering the legal and factual arguments made by the parties.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 19. Arbitrators must render a decision within 30 days of the close
of the hearings, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. NASD Rules § 41(d). The award
granted is often merely a one-line award indicating the prevailing party and the costs incurred.
Arbitrators have authority to grant any relief they deem "just and equitable under the
circumstances" and are not required, nor encouraged, to include a written opinionjustifying the
award. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 2. The award ultimately granted is, nevertheless, final
and binding on the parties. NASD Rules § 41(b). If, however, the losing party can prove some
error or bias on the part of the arbitrators, a reviewing court has the power to vacate the award.
See infra notes 126-56 and accompanying text (discussing grounds on which court can vacate
arbitration awards). The courts ability to vacate arbitration awards is severely limited and often
entirely restrained with out a written opinion.
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
12. Id. This section of the Arbitration Act states that an arbitration agreement "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
revocation of any contract." Id.; see also Arbitration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1988)
[hereinafter Arbitration Reform Hearings] (statement of Theodore Krebsbach) (suggesting that in
passing Arbitration Act Congress intended to allow parties to contract for quick resolution of
disputes and to reduce congestion of courts); Ranlet Sheldon Wilingham, Securities Arbitration:
Issues After McMahon, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 409, 423-24 (1989) (arguing that Congress
intended to enforce arbitration provisions in private contracts).
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to the court system. 13 The federal courts interpretation of the
Arbitration Act created a federal policy favoring arbitration of
securities disputes. 4
If the Arbitration Acts policy favoring arbitration fails to advance
the protection of investors, the Act will conflict with the goals of the
federal securities laws, which seek to protect investors. 5  The
delicate balance between the Arbitration Act and the federal securities
laws must be preserved. Arbitral procedures must be modified to
further the goals identified by Congress in enacting the federal
securities laws. Arbitration should not be converted to a full court
hearing comprised of lengthy discovery, complex evidentiary rules,
and legal opinions. Arbitration, however, should be modified to
incorporate the needs of current investors.1 Otherwise, both the
policy behind the federal securities laws and the Arbitration Act will
become empty promises. This Comment argues that section 41 of the
Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which
focuses on the content of the award statement, fails to adequately
protect investors as Congress intended. The NASD is one of a
number of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) delegated authority to
sponsor arbitral forums.' The other SROs have comparable rules
13. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
14. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (arguing that Arbitration Act
intended to place arbitration contracts "on the same footing as other contracts" and thereby
eliminate judicial hostility towards them). The Act created a federal policy favoring arbitration
that courts battled to maintain. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (explaining that result of Arbitration Act is to create federal body of
substantive law of arbitration, applicable to any arbitration agreement falling within Acts
coverage).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1994)) (stating that goal of Exchange Act is investor protection).
16. Since industry developments may change over time and expand in ways not
contemplated by the original drafters of an act, interpretation of a congressional act should
adapt to incorporate the changing needs of protected parties. This is not to suggest the policy
of the Arbitration Act needs review. The basic policy favoring arbitration and the enforcement
of contractual agreements remains clear. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11. The arbitration process
rules and procedures, however, must adapt to incorporate current concerns while still
recognizing the original intent of the Arbitration Act, which was to create a fair and efficient
alternative to the courts. Id.
17. See geneally NATIONAL ASSN OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SEcuRTIES REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 30-31 (1992) (addressing basic aspects and issues confronted in securities
arbitrations today). One of the most significant features of the Exchange Act was the formation
of the SEC. The SEC delegates significant regulatory authority to a number of private, member-
owned and operated organizations known as SROs. Id. at 9. These SROs include the NASD,
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), a number of
regional exchanges, and five option exchanges. Id In addition to SROs, there are independent
forums provided by other associations, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
which allow for dispute resolution. Id. The responsibilities of the SROs include compliance
with legal and ethical standards and the administration of arbitration forums for investors and
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that also need reform. 18 NASD section 41(e) states:
The award shall contain the names of the parties, the name of
counsel, if any, a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of
any security or product, in controversy, the damages and other
relief requested, the damages and other relief awarded, a statement
of any other issues resolved, the names of the arbitrators, the dates
the claim was filed and the award rendered, the number and dates
of hearing sessions, the location of the hearings, and the signatures
of the arbitrators concurring in the award. 9
Conspicuously absent from this list is a requirement that arbitrators
write a statement of reasons in support of their decision. Arbitrators
generally fill out a standard award form that merely identifies the
prevailing party and the costs incurred." Commentators who
oppose a requirement that arbitrators include a statement of reasons
argue that there is no evidence to suggest that arbitration will not
afford parties their substantive rights.2 They contend that requiring
a written opinion would compromise the efficiency of arbitration,"
industry members to redress disputes. Id. All SRO rules and regulations must be approved by
the SEC before they can take effect. Id. at 15. Together, the NASD and the NYSE process more
than 90% of all arbitration claims received. Id. at 31.
18. SeeAAA Rules § 42; AMEX Rule 618; NYSE Rule 627. For simplicity this Comment only
refers to NASD Rules.
19. NASD Rules § 41(e).
20. Interview with Egon Guttman, Professor, the American University, Washington College
of Law and Arbitrator, the NYSE and NASD (October 20, 1994) [hereinafter Interview with Egon
Guttman]; see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 99 (statement of Theodore A.
Krebsbach) (discussing practice of delivering one-line awards). Contrast this with arbitration
in the labor setting. In labor arbitration forums, written opinions, although not required, have
become the norm. Some commentators justify this phenomenon by suggesting that labor
arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is a mechanism through which content and meaning
are given to the collective bargaining agreement. These commentators suggests that commercial
arbitration, on the other hand, is transactional. By issuing opinions, labor arbitrators have
developed an area of law to assist both unions and employers in administering labor agreements.
Id.; see William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thirty Years of the
Steelworker Trilogy: The Aftermath ofAT&T andMisco, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 464,491-95 (1989)
(arguing that written opinions are needed in labor disputes because of unique aspects of labor
arbitration); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial
Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REv. 509, 509 (1990) (comparing
ability of labor arbitration and commercial arbitration to adequately resolve statutory disputes).
The issue of written opinions has also arisen in the court system. For a discussion of the
implications of the practice of federal courts declining to issue written opinions, see MarthaJ.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions
to Explain and Justio Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 757-802
(1995). This Comment, however, focuses only on how the issue of written opinions impacts
securities arbitration.
21. The Supreme Court has stated that arbitration is not an adequate forum to address
parties rights. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987)
(citing Wtlko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (FrankfurterJ., dissenting)).
22. See infra notes 209-21 and accompanying text (discussing assertion that requiring written
opinion would compromise arbitrations primary benefit of efficiency).
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discourage qualified arbitrators from serving," reduce the confiden-
tiality generally associated with arbitration,24 and result in few
benefits because disputes typically involve simple issues. 25  Such
critics fail to realize, however, that a statement of reasons will more
effectively promote the policies behind the federal securities laws by
reducing bias,26 restoring the credibility of the securities markets,27
promoting "meaningful review" of arbitration awards, 8 stimulating
the development of consistent federal common law,29 and enabling
investors to make informed decisions that would promote the further
economic development of the securities industry.30 Consequently,
NASD section 41 should be amended to require a statement of the
underlying reasons for the award because, as currently written, the
rule fails to protect investors as intended by Congress.
Parts I and II of this Comment note the historical background of
arbitration and the current status of the law. Specifically, Part I traces
the development of a federal policy favoring arbitration through court
interpretation and notes the pertinent arbitration reform movements.
Part II reviews the current case law and regulatory rules regarding
whether a statement of reasons should accompany an arbitration
award.
Parts III and IV analyze the possible effects and implications that
failure to include a reasoned decision may have on investors and the
securities industry. Specifically, Part III discusses the limited right to
appeal arbitration awards and notes the impact that a lack of
"meaningful review" has on the industry and its participants. Part IV
discusses the implications and the effect of decisions that are made
without the development of a predictable source of federal common
law that can promote uniformity in future decisions.
23. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (outlining argument that risk of lengthy
disputes tarnishing arbitrators reputations will deter arbitrators from serving).
24. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text (explaining contention that published
written opinions would reduce confidentiality of process, thus deterring parties from suing for
fear of being blacklisted).
25. See infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text (noting allegation that arbitration disputes
involve simple factual issues).
26. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text (discussing bias in arbitration).
27. See infra notes 283-94 and accompanying text (reiterating securities laws goal of investor
protection).
28. See infra notes 126-56 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of statement of
reasons on appeal).
29. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (arguing that statement of reasons
promotes judicial uniformity).
30. See infra notes 283-94 and accompanying text (discussing benefit of increased investor
protection through written opinions).
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Part V analyzes the arguments opposing a reasoned opinion
requirement and suggests that failing to require a written opinion will
sustain bias and reduce the credibility of the entire securities industry.
In conclusion, this Comment provides recommendations for a
possible construction and application of NASD Rule 41 (e).
I. ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES: FROM
WILKO TO McMAHoN AND RODRIGUEZ
The debate over the arbitrability of securities claims was confronted
by the Supreme Court in 1953 when it decided Wilko v. Swan. 1 In
Wilko, the Supreme Court held that parties whose claims arose under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act could not be compelled to go to
arbitration through a predispute arbitration agreement. 2 In this
manner, the Court enforced the policy of investor protection in the
Securities Act to allow parties recourse to the courts.3" The Court
held that certain disputes were exempt from the Arbitration Acts
policy, which demanded enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,
because parties could not be forced in advance to waive their right to
proceed in court. 4 The Supreme Court found that courts provided
investors with procedural rights that could not be substituted with
abbreviated arbitration procedures. 5 Of significance to the Court
was the fact that an award could be granted: (1) without an
explanation of reasons; (2) absent a complete record; and (3) with an
extremely limited ability to review and vacate." Accordingly, the
Court found that the plaintiff-investor could not be bound in advance
to submit a federal securities law fraud claim to arbitration. 7
In addition to holding that predispute arbitration agreements were
unenforceable, the Wilko decision also stands for the proposition that
private contractual agreements should be respected. Although the
contract in dispute in Wilko was held unenforceable, the Court clearly
stated that the contract was merely overridden by a stronger congres-
31. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overrued by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
32. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de QuUas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
33. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act creates a special right of action for misrepresentation
that is enforceable in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1994). Section 14 of the Act holds any provision waiving compliance with the Act void. Id.
§ 77n.
34. Wi/ko, 346 U.S. at 437.
35. Id. at 435; see also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29
(1987) (suggesting that Court in Wilko did not enforce predispute agreement because arbitration
was inadequate to protect substantive rights of investors).
36. Wiko, 346 U.S. at 436.
37. Id. at 431.
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sional command of investor protection." In his concurring opinion,
Justice Jackson added that private arbitration contracts were invalid
only if they were made before the dispute arose. 9 According to
Justice Jackson, if the agreement to arbitrate is reached after the
dispute arises, the investor has made an informed waiver and,
therefore, does not need protection from the Securities Act.4'
Hence, the private contract would be upheld.41
The Wilko doctrine, which encompasses the view that the Securities
Acts goal of investor protection should override the clear policy for
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the Arbitration Act, was
extended in 1961 to domestic claims arising out of the Exchange Act
in Reader v. Hirsch & Co.' In 1977, the Wilko doctrine was further
extended to disputes arising out of section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act
in Allegaert v. Perot.43 The viability of the Wilko doctrine, however,
slowly eroded. In 1974, twenty-one years after Wilko, the Supreme
Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," held that an international
dispute was subject to arbitration based on a preexisting arbitration
agreement.45 The Court was careful to distinguish the facts and law
in Scherk from those applicable in Wilko.46 The Court illustrated what
it referred to as "crucial differences" between the disputed contract
38. Id. at 437.
39. i& at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson theorized that predispute agreements
could not be enforced because "when the buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act,
waives his right to sue in Courts ... he surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him...
at a time when he is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon
his adversary." Id. at 435.
40. 1& at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
41. Id; see also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 252-53 & n.9
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accepting distinction between private contracts reached
before and after dispute arises).
42. 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that investor protection overrides goal of
enforcing arbitration rulings in domestic claims cases).
43. 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.) (extending overriding importance of investor protection in §
10(b) cases), cert. denieA 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
44. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
45. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520-21 (1974). The Court questioned the
applicability of ilko to a claim arising out of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, because the
Exchange Act does not expressly create a private cause of action. Id. at 513-14. The decision
in Wizko, however, was not yet overruled and continued to retain vitality among some of the
federal circuits in 1989 by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989). See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29
(10th Cir. 1978) (holding that investor remedies under federal securities laws were not waived
as result of arbitration agreements); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
558 F.2d 831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that, absent international concerns, arbitration
agreements are unenforceable in Rule 10b-5 claims).
46. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515; see also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 229 (1987) (discussing holding in Wilko as based on inadequacy of arbitration and noting
that Courts decision in Scherk is consistent with this view).
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in Wilko and the contract at issue in Scherk.47 First, the international
character of the dispute in Scherk lessened the need for investor
protection enunciated in Wilko.4s Additionally, the Court stated that
appearance before a specialized arbitral forum is necessary to
promote predictability of international disputes and eliminate the
dangers of disputes appearing before a judicial forum that is
unfamiliar with the laws and issues of the dispute involved.49 The
case is also important, however, for its emphasis on enforcing the
private contract reached by the parties." The Scherk decision eroded
the attitude underlying the Wilko doctrine because it recognized that
certain predispute arbitration agreements are valid and must be
enforced pursuant to the Arbitration Act.5 '
The Supreme Court continued with its endorsement of preexisting
arbitration agreements in the cases of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp. 52 and Southland Corp. v. Keating 3 The
slow destruction of the Wilko doctrine continued in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,54 decided in 1985. In Dean Witter Reynolds, the
Supreme Court held that pendent state law claims joined with
nonarbitrable federal securities law claims must be arbitrated pursuant
to predispute arbitration agreements. 5 The Court declined a
request by the parties, however, to resolve a dispute among the courts
about whether or not Wilko applies to claims under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act or SEC Rule 10b-5.5
A landmark decision came in 1987 when the Supreme Court, in
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,57 challenged the existing
body of case law that had begun with Wilko 8 In McMahon, the
Court held that securities fraud claims based on section 10(b) of the
47. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-16.
48. I& at 515.
49. Id at 516.
50. Id. at 516, 519 & n.15.
51. Compare id. at 519-20 (holding parties must arbitrate their international commercial
dispute pursuant to Arbitration Act) with Wiko, 346 U.S. at 437 (holding parties could not be
forced in advance to waive their right to proceed in court).
52. 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983) (holding that Court of Appeals acted properly by enforcing
prompt arbitration as intended by Congress).
53. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (recognizing Congress policy of favoring arbitration by enacting
Arbitration Act).
54. 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (holding that district court erred in refusing motion to compel
arbitration of state claims).
55. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221-24 (1985).
56. Id. at 216 n.1.
57. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
58. SeeDavidA. Lipton, Mandatory SecuritisIndustryArbitration: The Problems and the Solution,
48 MD. L REv. 881, 881 (1989) (explaining that for over 30 years prior to McMahon, federal
courts had followed Wilko and allowed investors to disregard predispute arbitration agreements
where claims arose out of federal securities laws).
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Exchange Act59 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO)6" were arbitrable." The Court did not expressly
overrule Wilko, but asserted that the Wilko decision was based on
presumptions that were no longer valid.62 Specifically, the Court
stated that Wilko was based on the presumption that arbitration would
not adequately protect investors substantive rights.63 According to
the McMahon decision, the Court in Wilko was justified in not
enforcing the predispute arbitration agreement because, at the time,
the Court had concluded that investors would not be protected in
arbitration in the manner intended by the securities statutes. 64 The
Court in McMahon noted that no evidence was presented to the Court
in 1953, nor could be presented to it today, suggesting that the
arbitral forums could not afford plaintiff-investors their substantive
rights.65 In McMahon, therefore, the Court held that the private
contract was valid and enforceable.66 A strong dissent by Justice
Blackmun attacked the majoritys interpretation of Wilko, arguing that
Wilko was based on providing investor protection.67 Justice Blackmun
argued that the same problems that existed in 1953 exist today,
notably, lack of a reasoned decision, lack of a complete and final
record, and the limited right to appeal.'
Despite the debate provoked by the McMahon decision concerning
the vitality of the Wilko doctrine, in 1989 the Supreme Court expressly
overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.69 The Court essentially held that predispute arbitration agree-
ments are binding on investors in Securities Act claims,7" as such
agreements had been held applicable in McMahon to Exchange Act
claims. The McMahon and Rodriguez decisions made virtually all claims
arising out of investor/broker disputes subject to arbitration pursuant
59. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
61. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.




65. IdL at 231. The Court suggested that the Wilko holding reflected a mistrust of the
arbitral process--a mistrust virtually eliminated today in an age where the SEC has superb
regulatory authority over the Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) and supervisory power of
approval over any proposed rules. Id at 231-34; see also Lipton, supra note 58, at 882 (discussing
history of investor ability to disregard arbitration when claims arose under federal securities
laws).
66. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
67. Id at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 249-57 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
69. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
70. Rodriguez de Qujas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,485-86 (1989).
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to a predispute arbitration agreement.7' Thus, the Supreme Court
sanctioned the trend toward recognizing the Arbitration Acts policy
of enforcing all private contractual agreements to arbitrate.72
Accordingly, in the years following McMahon and Rodriguez
tremendous efforts were exerted toward reforming arbitration
procedures.7" Questions about the adequacy of arbitration led to the
formation of task forces to amend the arbitration rules.74 The courts
and "commentary of the time" brought attention to the potential
problems the arbitration process might pose for the investing public
and the legal community.75 The problems posed by arbitration
included: (1) limited ability to appeal;76  (2) limited discovery
procedures allowed in arbitration as compared to litigation;" (3)
absence of a record;" (4) lack of explanation accompanying the
71. Lipton, supra note 58, at 882; see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 1
(statement of Hon. EdwardJ. Markey) (suggesting that two factors have increased number of
cases being drawn to arbitration: (1) McMahon decision and (2) October 1987 market crash,
in which individual investors suffered substantial losses).
72. The recent case of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212,
1219 (1995), decided by the Supreme Court in January, reiterates this notion. See also supra
notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act).
73. SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, Other Reirsions to Industry Programs, 21 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 683, 683 (May 12, 1989) [hereinafter SECApprovesArbitration Summaries].
74. The SROs have worked together since 1977 to develop the uniform arbitration rules
under the auspices of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA). Securities
Arbitration: How InvestorsFare, in SECURIIESARBrITATION 1992,19,34 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7006, 1992) [hereinafter How Investors Fare]. SICA was formed
in 1977 by the SEC to review the existing arbitration procedures. Id. at 34. SICA is composed
of a representative from each SRO and the Securities Industry Association, and four individuals
from the public. Id. In 1985, following Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985),
the SEC began an 18-month review of the fairness and efficiency of SRO arbitration programs,
recognizing that it signalled the likely increase of arbitration of securities claims. How Investors
Fare, supra, at 39. In 1987, after the McMahon decision, the SEC recommended changes to
SICAs Uniform Code of Arbitration. After lengthy negotiations, the SEC approved proposed
rules to govern the arbitration process. Id.
The AAA also responded to the pressure of reforming the arbitration procedures. Id. In
October 1991, the AAA created the Securities Arbitration Task Force (SATF) made up of
investors attorneys, representatives from various brokerage firms, and other knowledgeable
persons. George H. Friedman, The New Security Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1993: PRODUCT, PROCEDURES, AND CAUSES OF ACTIONS
23, 39 (PLI Corp. Law. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-819, 1993). The mission of
the SATF was to improve the rules to make procedures more attractive to arbitration
participants. Id. The Task Force met 11 times from November 1991, to February 1993, and the
AAA rules were amended effective May 1, 1993. Id.
75. SeeJoseph L Hood,Jr., Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers Claims Against Broker-
Dealers After McMahon, 19 ST. MARYS L.J. 541,579-85 (1988) (arguing that as investors securities
claims are referred massively to arbitration, many securities industry personnel may find
.perceived advantages [of arbitration] are largely illusory"). Id. at 579.
76. Lipton, supra note 52, at 882; see also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 257-58 (1987) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
77. Lipton, supra note 58, at 882.
78. Lipton, supra note 58, at 882; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 257-58 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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decision;79 and (5) absence of a rule of precedent or stare decisis. °
As a result, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA)
was created to represent all the arbitral forums in their evaluation of
these and other concerns expressed about the effectiveness of
arbitration."'
In a recent press release,8" the NASD announced the formation of
its own Arbitration Policy Task force led by David S. Ruder, former
SEC Chairman.83 The NASD Task Forces authority, however, is
limited to the NASD forum. SICA, however, represents all the
SROs. 4 The Task Force is composed of nine members, including
individuals with a lifelong commitment to public interest, SEC alumni,
NASD Senior Executives, academicians, and arbitration practitio-
ners.
85
The mission of the NASD Task Force is to ascertain "whether the
arbitration process is meeting its goal of being an inexpensive, fast,
and fair way to settle disputes."86  The Task Force will study the
evolution of the arbitration rules in terms of the stated goals of
arbitration. 7 The Task Force will concentrate on the factors
79. Lipton, supra note 58, at 882; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 257-58 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing written opinions are needed for investor protection).
80. Lipton, supra note 58, at 882.
81. How Investors Fare, supra note 74, at 19.
82. Former SEC Head to Chair NASD Task Force on Arbitration, NATIONAL ASSN OF SECURITIES
DEALERS PRESS RELEASE (NASD, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 9, 1994 [hereinafter SEC Head to Chair
Task Force].
83. Id.
84. See How Investors Fare, supra note 74, at 34. SICAs duty is to evaluate arbitration
procedures. See Lynnette Khalfani, Two Securities-Industry Committees Vie for Right to Handle
Arbitration Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at A5A. SICA members criticized the NASD Task
Force for usurping SICAs historical role. Id. Members of the NASD defended the new Task
Force by suggesting that SICAs role is limited and that the NASD, as the largest SRO forum, has
unique and broader interests that the new Task Force will accommodate. Id.
85. The members are: David S. Ruder, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School
of Law, and former Chairman of the SEC (1987-1989); J. Boyd Page, Partner at Page & Bacek
and current President of Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, member of the NASD
National Arbitration Committee, member of the AAA Securities Advisory Committee, and
member of the Board of Advisors of the Securities Arbitration Commentator; Francis 0. Spalding,
Adjunct Professor of Law at Golden Gate University School of Law, current Chairman of the
NASD National Arbitration Committee, member of the AAA Securities Advisory Committee;
Richard Speidel, the Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law
and co-author of a five volume treatise entitled Federal Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards and
Remedies Under the Federal Arbitration Act John Bachmann, Managing Partner of Edward D.Jones
& Co.; John A. Wing, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Chicago Corporation;
Stephen L. Hammerman, Vice Chairman and General Counsel of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.;
StephenJ. Friedman, former SEC Commissioner (1980-1981), former Executive Vice President
and General Counsel for the Equitable Companies Incorporation and currently Senior Partner
of Debevoise & Plimpton; and Linda D. Fienberg, Of Counsel with Covington & Burling and
former Associate General Counsel and Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the SEC. SEC
Head to Chair NASD Task Force, supra note 82.
86. Khalfani, supra note 84, at A5A (statement of Debora Masucci).
87. Khalfani, supra note 84, at ASA.
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affecting the arbitration process that many contend have reduced its
effectiveness and efficiency while increasing parties costs.' The Task
Force will submit a final report with recommendations to the NASD
in December of 1995.89
Among the rules to be evaluated by the Task Force is NASD Rule
41, which describes the content of an award.9" This Comment is
designed to affect the Task Forces decision on whether to require
arbitrators to state the reasons behind their awards or, in the
alternative, to guide future evaluative teams.
II. ARBITRATORS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO STATE THE REASONS
BEHIND THEIR DECISION
A. Judicial Interpretation
Case law undeniably establishes that arbitrators do not need to state
the reasons behind their awards.91 Courts and commentators argue
that requiring written opinions would undermine the policy behind
arbitration, which is to provide a quick, efficient, and informal means
of alternative dispute resolution.92 Courts generally feel it is not
their role to interfere with the proper functioning of arbitration,
especially given the express contractual agreement reached by the
parties.93
88. Khalfani, supra note 84, at ASA.
89. Khalfani, supra note 84, at ASA.
90. For similar rules promulgated by other arbitral forums regarding the content of
arbitration awards, see supra note 18.
91. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on othergrounds by Rodriguez de QuUas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning
Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,
793 F.2d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir.), cert. denie, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
92. See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (lth
Cir. 1990) (arguing that requiring arbitrators to explain their reasons would defeat policy in
favor of expedited procedures); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th
Cir.) (commenting that forcing arbitrators to explain awards would "subvert the proper
functioning of the arbitral process") (citing Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215
(2d Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211,
1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that sacrifice in legal precision is necessary in order to preserve
proper functioning of arbitration process); Securities Arbitration Group Opposes Mandatory Written
Opinions in All Cases, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1952, 1953 (Dec. 25, 1987)
(arguing that requiring written opinion "could very well hinder, rather than enhance, the
administration of arbitration proceedings in that it would be time consuming and burdensome
and thus may discourage many qualified individuals from serving as an arbitrator"). Seegenerally
STEPHEN P. DOYLE & ROGERS. HAYDOCK, WITHOUTTHE PUNCHES, RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LmGATION 21-22 (1991).
93. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218-19 (1995)
(enforcing arbitration award of compensatory and punitive damages in securities dispute because
parties' contract provided for both possibilities).
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In Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.,94 the Second Circuit noted that
public interest demands that arbitration remain an efficient and
economical alternative. 5 The court held that requiring written
opinions would be destructive to the system and would "diminish
whatever efficiency the process now achieves."9" Recently, in Antwine
v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,9" the Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that arbitrators, pursuant to the arbitration rules, need not write a
reasoned opinion."8 The court held that American Arbitration
Association (AAA) Rule 42, which requires an award to include a
"statemente regarding the disposition of statutory claims, does not
require the arbitration panel to provide a statement of reasons
underlying the award.99 The court in Antwine explicitly rejected the
argument that the AAA had placed the need for comprehensive
development of theory over notions of expediency and economy) °°
The SEC has agreed that written opinions would diminish the
efficiency of arbitration.1 In a SEC report evaluating proposed
rules submitted to the SEC by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the NASD,'02 the SEC
stated that it did not believe it was in the public interest to require
written opinions.
0 3
Courts continue to support the view that arbitrators need not
provide a statement of reasons."° The justification is based primari-
ly on a notion that private contracts between parties should be
94. 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972).
96. Id.
97. 899 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1990).
98. Antwine v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990).
99. Id. For other interpretations of the Antwine decision, see Frank E. Massengale & Marie
Breaux Stroud, Federal Securities Law, 5th Circuit Symposium, 36 LOY. L. REv. 821, 823-25 (1990)
(describing approval of unwritten decision as counter to concerns of investigating public); Jane
E. Zangleir, Securities Law, Fifth Circuit Survey, 22 TEX. TEcH. L. REv. 685,69-95 (1991) (arguing
that court's ruling is inconsistent with AAA's position on written opinions for statutory issues).
100. Antine, 899 F.2d at 412 & n.2.
101. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Pre-dispute Arbitration
Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,151-52 (1989) [hereinafter SEC Order] (warning that it would
be inappropriate to require written opinions because it "could slow the arbitration process and
discourage many persons from participating as arbitrators").
102. Id. at 21,151.
103. Id.; see also infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's reasons for
concluding that written arbitration would cause more harm than good). But see infra notes 224-
36 and accompanying text (responding that written opinions are needed and would not be
inefficient).
104. See generally Antwine v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 899 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1990);
Sobal v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F. 2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972).
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enforced under the terms specified in the contract. 5 Courts seem
to be unwilling to interpret an additional provision for which the
parties neither contemplated nor contracted. The development of a
written opinion in arbitration decisions, therefore, ultimately must
come from a different source.
B. Recent Regulatory Reforms to Arbitration Rules
A party appears before an SRO-sponsored arbitral forum through
either a predispute arbitration agreement or an agreement reached
after a dispute arises. In either case, parties contract to appear before
the arbitral forum that they feel best represents their interests.06
The rules and standards adopted by the SRO forum create the terms
and give meaning to the contract between the parties. The SROs,
therefore, periodically evaluate and reform their procedures to
accommodate the needs expressed by parties."°7
Recent reforms to arbitration procedures indicate that the SROs are
affirmatively responding to participants' desire to receive written
opinions in certain circumstances.10 8 The SROs are adding this to
the contractual agreement reached by the parties. The first recent
reform initiated by the SROs concerns "large and complex" dis-
putes."° Before 1990, a party to an arbitration hearing had difficul-
ty obtaining a written opinion. Under the arbitration rules, a party
could obtain a written decision only if both parties and the arbitrator
consented."0 The rules for large and complex cases, however, were
amended in June 1990 to make it easier for parties to obtain written
findings of fact and conclusions of law."' These amendments were
approved by the NASD, NYSE, AMEX, and the AAA." 2 Under the
new rules, only one party to a large and complex dispute needs to
request a written decision." 3 Also, if the arbitrators do not comply
with the request, they will be replaced." 4
105. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218-19 (1995)
(enforcing arbitration award of compensatory and punitive damages in securities dispute because
contract provided for both options).
106. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing ability of parties to choose among
various arbitral forums pursuant to their arbitration clause).
107. See generally Rules Changed to Make Written Findings Easier to Obtain in Larger Arbitrations,
22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 816, 816 (June 1, 1990) [hereinafter Rules Changed].
108. See id. (discussing implementation of new rule requiring arbitrators to provide written
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The types of cases qualifying for large and complex treatment will
be determined by arbitrators on a case-by-case basis. Cases likely to
qualify are class actions, cases involving multiple parties, cases dealing
with a novel legal theory, and disputes involving potentially large sums
of money."5 Commentators suggest that routine disputes, on the
other hand, involve the simple application of commercial judgment
for which a written opinion is unnecessary."6 In Part V, this
Comment argues that the value of a written opinion extends much
further than these commentators recognize.'
7
The second recent reform to the arbitration rules involves the
printing of a one page summary award statement highlighting the
results of arbitration proceedings.' In May 1989, the SEC an-
nounced that the SROs will begin disseminating summary arbitration
data outlining arbitrations conducted." 9 The summary information
will enable the investing public to review how arbitration cases are
decided. The summary statements, however, cannot be used as prece-
dent.2 Although the summaries will not be published, they will be
readily available to the public at individual SRO's public reference
rooms.12 1 The summary award statement will include: (1) the
name of the case; (2) a one paragraph summary of the dispute; (3)
115. See Ruder Urges Rules to Allow Arbitrators to Refer Complex Cases to Court System, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1087, 1087 (July 15, 1988). In this report, Ruder commented that
he expected the SROs to consider procedures to permit investor access to courts in certain
situations. Id. He suggested these types of cases should be referred to the courts to permit the
adherence of precedent to guide arbitrators and others on the interpretation of statutory
provisions of the federal securities laws. Id. These types of complicated suits arguably would
qualify for large and complex treatment as well. See also Perry E. Wallace,Jr., Securities Arbitration
After McMahon, Rodriguez and the New Rules: Can Investors Really be Protected?, 43 VAND. L REV.
1199, 1250 (1990) (arguing that arbitrators should consider referring class actions, cases
challenging industry practices, and disputes involving extensive discovery to courts). The
application of this rule is expected to be rare, but officials suggest its applicability "will be self-
evident." Rules Changed, supra note 107, at 816.
116. See Arbitration Reform Hearinge, supra note 12, at 99-100 (statement of Theodore
Krebsbach) (arguing that vast majority of arbitrations involve only factual determinations of
whether broker defrauded client through misrepresentation, churning or purchasing an
unsuitable investment); see alsoWallace, supranote 115, at 1249-50 & 1249 n.257 (suggesting that
existing arbitration procedures are adequate for typical customer or broker complaints, but
complex cases should be referred to courts); infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text
(discussing this point in detail).
117. See infra notes 271-82 and accompanying text (suggesting that requirement of written
opinions would promote policy behind securities laws).
118. See SEC Staff Suggests Arbitration Group Adopt Use of One-Page Award Statement, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 559, 560 (Apr. 15, 1988) [hereinafter One-Page Award Statement]
(providing example of simplified public award statement).
119. See SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 73, at 683 (noting that this change
resulted from SEC meeting on rule changes proposed by NASD and others); NASD Rules
§41(f).
120. One-Page Award Statement, supra note 118, at 559.
121. See SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 73, at 683.
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damages or other relief requested; (4) damages or other relief
awarded; and (5) a summary of other issues resolved, such as
jurisdictional questions. 122  The proposal for summary award state-
ments was part of a package of proposals aimed at countering the
public opinion that mandatory arbitration agreements were unfair to
investors and that current disclosure was insufficient.1 23 Here again,
the SROs incorporated participants' concerns by adding new
procedures that will be incorporated into the contractual agreement
between the parties.
These recent developments suggest that the SROs are beginning to
realize that a written decision, or at least a summary of factual issues,
is desirable and necessary in certain situations. The SROs have taken
an affirmative step by recognizing that the arbitration rules must
adapt to incorporate current needs of parties. In this manner, the
SROs are enabling parties to receive more freely written opinions by
altering the rules that will ultimately create the terms of the pre-
dispute arbitration contract. Written opinions should be required in
all situations, however, because they enable all investors, notjust those
engaged in a large and complex dispute, to review past decisions and
become better equipped to make sound investment decisions.
Summary data, although a commendable step by the SROs, is limited
in scope because the data only enables parties to evaluate sparse
factual summaries. Routine opinions develop a coherent body of
principles for arbitrators to follow when making decisions and,
therefore, also enhance the ability to predict outcomes. Additionally,
written opinions would enable parties to avoid wasting resources by
allowing them to uncover potential predispositions of arbitrators.1
2 1
Collectively, routine opinions would allow investors to be more
informed, and to have confidence in the efficient operation of the
securities markets."
122. SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries; supra note 73, at 683.
123. NYSE Proposes Highlighting Rights, Providing Summay Data on Arbitrations, 20 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1783, 1783 (Nov. 25, 1988) (detailing how changes arc result of
protracted discussion among several members of SICA).
124. Some commentators have warned that requiring arbitrators to submit written opinions
would have detrimental effects. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 102 (statement
of Theodore Krebsbach) (arguing that judging arbitrator's track record based on percentage
of disputes decided for one side or another encourages "arbitrator shopping"); see also William
C. Herrnann, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors
Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. Lj. 697, 714 (1990) (suggesting that arbitrator shopping favors
securities industry because it has best access to results of prior arbitration hearings generally not
publicly available).
125. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Securities Act).
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III. WRITrEN OPINIONS ACCOMPANYING ARBITRATION AwARDs
WOULD ALLOW FOR "MEANINGFUL REVIEW"
A. Vacatur of Arbitration Awards Is Limited
A "meaningful review" of arbitration awards is essential in determin-
ing whether arbitration truly affords parties their substantive rights.
Meaningful review entails an actual analysis by the court of the
arbitrator's decision, instead of summary approval.126 Without a
written opinion, however, a court is unable to review meaningfully an
arbitration decision, because it is difficult to uncover potential
problems such as bias or mistake.
1 27
When investors decide to submit their claim to arbitration, they
forgo the right to appeal because arbitration is a final decision that
is binding on the parties. 2 If the party prevailing in arbitration has
difficulty enforcing the arbitration decision, however, the Arbitration
Act allows the party to ask the appropriate district court 29 to
confirm the award. 3 ° Generally, the award must be summarily
confirmed and "can only be denied if an award has been corrected,
vacated, or modified in accordance with the Federal Arbitration
Act."' The losing party may also petition the court to vacate'32
or modify'33 the arbitration decision, in which case the aforemen-
tioned standard must also be applied by the reviewing court.
The grounds upon which a court can vacate an arbitration award
are, however, extremely limited."M Courts do not re-hear claims of
126. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (explaining impossibility of judicial
scrutiny of awards without written explanations by arbitrators).
127. See infra notes 134-56 and accompanying text (discussing grounds in which court can
vacate arbitration awards).
128. See NASD Rules § 41 (b) (stating that "all awards rendered pursuant to this Code shall
be deemed final and not subject to review or appeal").
129. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). The appropriate district court is in the jurisdiction where the
arbitration award was made. Id, Note that the parties have just one year from the date of the
award to seek confirmation. Id.
130. Id.
131. Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 300, 301 (D. Kan. 1989) (citing
Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that confirmation of
arbitration award is required even in face of "erroneous findings of fact or misinterpretations
of law"), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1200 (1983).
132. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
133. Id. § 11.
134. SeeWilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating that judicial review of arbitration
award is even narrower than judicial review of trial proceedings), ovenued on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Antwine v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1990) (alluding to narrow scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards). But seeJeffrey A. Winikoff & Maxine Streeter Bradford,
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legal error committed by an arbitrator in the same manner as
appellate courts review decisions of lower courts. 5 Instead, courts
are bound to defer to the arbitration decision,3 6 except under the
statutory exceptions outlined in section 10 of the Arbitration Act."3 7
The limited grounds on which a reviewing district court may vacate
an arbitration award and direct a rehearing'8 occur when
(1) the arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators ... ;(3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing ... , or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
(4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter was not made. 9
Blue Sky Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NovA L. REv. 45, 66-68 (1993) (suggesting that
review may not be so limited because in Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985
F.2d 1067 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1993), court held that issue of resjudicata
should be left for court to decide). For discussion of resjudicata as it applies to arbitration
decisions, see infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
135. See United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); see also Forsythe
Int'l v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that arbitration always
contains legal and evidentiary shortcuts as compared to formal trials and reviewing court should
resist correcting them without valid statutory basis for doing so); Hood, supra note 75, at 586
(discussing limited standard of review for arbitration award when compared to courts). Courts
are bound by Rule 52(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to review trial courts findings of
fact with "clearly erroneous" standard and conclusions of law "de novo," whereas courts may only
vacate an arbitration award in narrow situations, pursuant to § 10 of Arbitration Act. Id.
136. See McIlroy v. Paine Webber Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that courts
owe great degree of deference to ruling of arbitral bodies); see also Anderson/Smith Operating
Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (commenting that
congressional policy in promoting arbitration and efficiency requires that courts refrain from
intruding into questions settled by arbitrators), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991).
137. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
138. Id. For an example of a court vacating an arbitration award, see Tinaway v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 658 F. Supp. 576,579 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that because arbitrator's reduction
of award was so substantial it manifested "evident partiality" and thus fell within Code provision
regarding vacation of arbitration awards).
139. 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994). Case law applying 9 U.S.C. § 10 is plentiful. See, e.g., Mcllroy, 989
F.2d at 820 (denying movant's attempt to vacate award on grounds that award was product of
.gross mistake"); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412-13
(11th Cir. 1990) (finding that judicial review of arbitration awards should be limited to statutory
provision and not expanded to include "manifest disregard of law" standard); O.R. Sec. v.
Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that in order to vacate
award on basis of arbitrator's manifest disregard of law, movants must show that arbitrators knew
law and expressly disregarded it);Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633-34
(10th Cir. 1988) (discussing view that courts should go beyond narrow scope of 9 U.S.C. § 10
to encompass "abuse of discretion" type standard when reviewing arbitral awards); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting possibility that
judicially created "manifest disregard of law" standard expands on reasons for vacating award
enunciated in 9 U.S.C. § 10); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir.)
(denying request to vacate award because no elements for judicial action under 9 U.S.C. § 10
were met), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); Ketchum v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 710 F.
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In addition, some appellate courts have adopted the narrow
"manifest disregard" of the law standard.1" Manifest disregard of
the law cannot be implemented without "meaningful review" because
manifest disregard "means more than error or misunderstanding with
respect to the law." 1' "Manifest disregard must be made clearly to
appear," and may be found "when arbitrators understand and correctly
state the law, but proceed to disregard the same."" Therefore, an
inherent problem exists in applying the manifest disregard standard
when arbitrators do not include a statement of reasons with the
award. Without a written opinion, courts can neither analyze nor
investigate the underlying rationale of the arbitration decision.
Consequently, courts cannot engage in meaningful review. As a result
the manifest disregard standard becomes hollow because courts are
unable to ascertain whether or not arbitrators followed the law."4
The court is left to assume that the arbitrator's decision was ratio-
nal.' Consequently, arbitration awards are insulated from any
Supp. 300, 301 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding that arbitrator did not so imperfectly execute his powers
so as to require vacating award).
140. See, ag.,Jenkins, 847 F.2d at 634 (defining manifest disregard standard as arbitral award
that is contrary to essence of parties' contract); Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933 (holding that manifest
disregard of law by arbitrators "clearly means more than error of misunderstanding with respect
to the law"); Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 750 (cautioning that it is arbitrator's disregard of
law, not interpretation of law, which is open to judicial review and must be overwhelmingly
shown by appellant).
141. Raford, 903 F.2d at 1412 (citing Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933). The Raiford court suggested
that to prove that an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, a party must demonstrate that:
(1) the error is so obvious that it would instantly be noticed by the arbitrator;, (2) the arbitrator
knew the law but proceeded to disregard it; and (3) the disregard must be apparent on the face
of the record. Id. at 1412-13.
142. Ketchum, 710 F. Supp. at 303 (citing Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 750) (emphasis
added).
143. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151. In the SEC hearings, Public Citizen Litigation
Group and Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association advocated for written opinions by arguing
that records of hearings were inadequate for a court to apply the "manifest disregard" standard.
SEC Order, supra note 88, at 21,151; see asoJohn L. Latham & Lynn Scott Magruder, Securities
Regulation, Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1519, 1540 (1991) (discussing
Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1410, where court expressed doubt that manifest disregard standard could
ever be met when arbitrators do not give their reasons); Massengale & Stroud, supra note 99,
at 825 n.34 (arguing that without an opinion, there is nothing for courts to review). But see
Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 100 (statement of Theodore Krebsbach) (arguing
that there is no reason to suggest party cannot vacate award without written factual and legal
conclusions because party can attach portion of arbitration transcript or relevant exhibits to
support motion made to court).
144. Valentine Sugars Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir.) (stating that district
court must affirm arbitration award, even without arbitrator's written statement of reasons, if
award is "rationally inferable" from facts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3039 (1993); Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 338 F. Supp. 287, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 469 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
Although the Second Circuit eventually reversed the district court's holding in Sobel, the district
court, remanding the arbitration decision to the arbitrators for a statement of reasons, argued
quite persuasively that without written opinions, courts would be left with a bare record and
would have to assume that the arbitrators had correctly decided the dispute. Id.
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reasonable judicial scrutiny." Some courts have recognized this
inherent conflict and have been unwilling to apply the manifest
disregard standard.'
Additionally, the useless application of the manifest disregard
standard led some courts to recognize that, in particular situations,
remand of the award to the arbitrator for clarification is proper.
47
For example, in Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.,"4 the dispute involved
an investor who appealed to the district court to vacate an unfavor-
able arbitration award. The district court remanded the proceeding
to the arbitration panel to state the reasons for its decision.'49 The
court noted that if arbitrators do not state the reasons behind an
award, a court is unable to decide whether or not the arbitrators
correctly applied the law. 50  On interlocutory appeal,' however,
145. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 53 (statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein)
(suggesting that already limited right to appeal arbitration award, which is further diminished
when arbitrators do not state reasons underlying award, eliminates any effective means of testing
award's legal adequacy or remedial sufficiency). As one author noted, "[b]lanket approval of
arbitration decisions rendered without an opinion ... is currently chilling judicial review of
arbitration decisions." Massengale, supra note 99, at 825 n.34 (commenting that, without written
opinion, there is nothing for court to review and court becomes "rubber stamp" for arbitration
decision).
146. Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir.
1990) ("This court has never adopted the manifest-disregard-of-thelaw standard; indeed, we have
expressed some doubt as to whether it should be adopted since the standard would likely never
be met when the arbitrator provides no reasons for its award .. ."); see also O.IK Secs., Inc. v,
Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 & n.4 (noting difficulty of showing that
arbitrators expressly disregarded law supports argument against applying manifest disregard
standard when vacating arbitration awards). But see Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.,
783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir.) (refusing to vacate award by applying "manifest disregard" standard
even though arbitrators failed to identify law applied or reasons used in reaching decision), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
147. See, e.g., Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp, 779 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that
remand for clarification ... would not improperly require arbitrators to reveal their reasons,
but would instead simply require them to fulfill their obligation" to justify award so that court
can effectively review decision) (citing Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d
Cir. 1972)); Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Gould, 776 F.2d 42, 4546 (2d Cir. 1985)
(recognizing that it is occasionally proper for courts to remand awards to arbitrators for better
description of meaning or effect of award); United Steel Workers of Am., Local 8249 v. Adbill
Management Corp., 754 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a] remand for further
arbitration is appropriate in only certain limited circumstances such as when an award is
incomplete or ambiguous").
148. 338 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), re,'d, 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
149. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 338 F. Supp. 287, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 469 F.2d
1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
150. Id. at 293. In support of its position, the district court citedJustice Frankfurter's dissent
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953), ove'uled on other grounds by Rodriguez de QuUas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), stating*
Arbitrators may not disregard the law .... But since their failure to observe the law
"would... constitute grounds for vacating the awardpursuant to ... [the] Federal
Arbitration Act" ... appropriate means for judicial scrutiny must be implied, in the
form of some record or opinion, however informal, whereby such compliance will
appear, or want of it will upset the award.
Sobe4 338 F. Supp. at 293 n.18.
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the appellate court reversed. 152  The appellate court agreed both
that the loss of legal precision is apparent and that consequently, a
reviewing court is confronted with a dilemma absent a statement of
reasons. 1 3  The court held, however, that remanding arbitration
awards for clarification "would undermine the very purpose of
arbitration which is to provide a relatively quick, efficient, and
informal means of private dispute settlement." 1s Justifying the
sacrifice of legal precision and the resulting loss of meaningful
judicial review with only an "efficiency" argument'55 may no longer
be sufficient because the costs and efficiency of arbitration are directly
under attack.
156
B. The SEC Position
In the 1989 SEC Order of Proposed Rule Changes to the NYSE, the
NASD, and the AMEX, the SEC concluded that arbitrators need not
provide reasons for their awards.157 The SEC concluded that the
benefits of requiring a written opinion do not outweigh the concerns.
First, the SEC suggested that the data to be included in the awards
under the new proposals, together with the pleadings and record,
should be sufficient for a court to apply the manifest disregard
standard."5  Second, the SEC commented that arbitrators may
reach agreement on the dollar amount of an award without reaching
a consensus regarding the reasons for the award.'59 Third, the SEC
151. See Sobe4 338 F. Supp. at 300 (noting that courts of appeal will tend to accept
interlocutory appeal if question of law deals with unsettled issue) (citing Goldlawr Inc. v.
Heiman, 273 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1959)).
152. Sobel 469 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
153. I at 1215.
154. I Other courts and commentators have agreed with this result. See San Martine
Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1961)
("[Ain award... which is one within the terms of the submission[] will not be set aside by a
court for error in either law or fact .... 'Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide
the matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal.... A contrary course would be a
substitution of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an
award the commencement, not the end, of litigation'" (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 344, 349 (1854))); see also Lipton, supra note 58, at 883 ("[It is reasonable to believe that
if arbitration awards were appealable for the full range of reasons for which judicial decisions
may be appealed, the efficiency of the arbitration mechanism would be reduced.").
155. See infra notes 209-36 and accompanying text (developing and responding to efficiency
argument).
156. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing recent questions raised
regarding costs and efficiency of arbitration).
157. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151.
158. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151 n.45. The SEC's leap is very optimistic and
incorporates many assumptions without recognizing the strictness of the manifest disregard
standard and the complexity a court faces when applying it. For a discussion of the standard,
see supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
159. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151.
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advanced an efficiency argument by suggesting that requiring written
opinions would slow down the process and discourage arbitrators
from participating." Finally, the SEC felt that the proposals had
already changed the procedures significantly and it wanted to give
both the SROs and potential parties time to adjust before implement-
ing additional changes."' The SEC suggested that this adjustment
period would enable arbitrators to begin writing opinions indepen-
dently if they saw the need. 62
The SEC's last proposition is overly optimistic and places too much
faith in the honest initiative of arbitrators." In reality, arbitrators
are unlikely to expose themselves to judicial review by independently
writing opinions."6 For the sake of fairness and investor protection,
the SEC should have required written opinions. It should not have
delegated the responsibility to the good sense of arbitrators."t
Written opinions and meaningful judicial review are needed
because they reduce the likelihood that arbitrators will grant excessive
awards that often are the result of arbitrators' propensity to become
emotionally involved in the dispute." Such a requirement would
also reveal the legal standard on which the arbitrators based their
decisions. 67 Without written opinions, the reviewing court is unable
either to apply the limited grounds enumerated by Congress for
vacatur of an arbitration award or to use the judicially created
manifest disregard standard effectively." As a result, arbitration
awards are virtually insulated from judicial scrutiny.
This Comment does not suggest that arbitration should not be final
and binding, nor does it advocate increasing avenues of judicial
review. It does argue, however, that the limited basis for review that
Congress outlined in Section 10 of the Arbitration Act should be
160. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151-52.
161. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151.
162. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151. The SEC pointed to the developments in the
labor area, where arbitrators voluntarily began writing opinions to better understand changes
in the law. Id. For a brief discussion of labor arbitration, see supra note 20.
163. See Hermann, supra note 124, at 715 (stating that SEC's position puts great deal of faith
in initiative of arbitrators).
164. Hermann, supra note 124, at 715; Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 53-59
(statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein).
165. See Hermann, supra note 124, at 715 (stating that arbitrators can use their complete
discretion in choosing whether to write opinions).
166. Hermann, supra note 124, at 715. If arbitrators must justify the merits of a particular
award through a written opinion, they would be less prone to emotional biases. Arbitrators
would be careful to deliver an award that is warranted from the facts or applicable law.
167. Hermann, supra note 124, at 715.
168. Hermann, supra note 124, at 715.
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applied effectively. Requiring written opinions would allow for such
meaningful review of arbitration awards.
IV. LACK OF DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW HAS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. Unpredictability in Future Cases
Arbitration does not create a uniform, consistent, and predictable
body of federal common law because arbitrators need not state the
reasons for their decision.'69 The limited right to appeal arbitration
awards contributes to the lack of uniformity70 because appellate
courts rarely have the opportunity to verify an arbitrator's legal
interpretation to facilitate the formation of appropriate
decisionmaking standards.' Such a process is incapable of meeting
the basic objectives of the legal system because it fails to provide
guidance for future 'decisions, produce jurisprudential cohesiveness,
or provide grounds for judicial challenges.'72 Moreover, written
opinions enable litigators to prepare arguments properly and allow
arbitrators to decide cases correctly and uniformly.'78
Although arbitration awards would not guarantee the outcome of
a future dispute because they do not have precedential value, 74
collectively they would foster greater expectation and certainty by
enabling investors to (1) become familiar with previous disputes
involving similar issues, (2) learn the prevailing standards used for
decisionmaking, and (3) acquire knowledge about the experience of
and findings reached by particular arbitrators. Greater expectation
and certainty would lead to better informed investors. Ultimately,
better informed investors and greater predictability in decisionmaking
would lead to more confidence in the arbitration system. 75
169. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Kearse, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 124; Lipton, supra note 58, at 888; Wallace, supra note 115, at 1247-48.
171. Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248.
172. Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248.
173. See Lipton, supra note 58, at 888 (arguing that written decision accompanying prior
arbitration is critical to assist arbitrators in decisionmaking process and to aid parties in
preparation of future arbitration hearings); Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248 (suggesting that
written opinions would develop body of federal common law that could help litigators prepare
cases and arbitrators "render fair and consistent awards").
174. See infra note 177 (recognizing that arbitrators often are not constrained by law). Given
this practice, an outcome can rarely be predicted on the basis of stare decisis.
175. SEC Order, supranote 101, at 21,152 (mentioning statement made by Shearson Lehman
that investor confidence would grow if arbitration awards were made public).
THE AMEIUCAN UNVERSrIY LAw REviEW [Vol. 45:151
B. Insufficient Assurance That the Federal Securities Laws Are Being
Interpreted Properly
Since the landmark decision of Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, which held that predispute arbitration agreements arising
under the Securities Act are enforceable, arbitrators have increasingly
assumed the primary role in interpreting federal securities laws. 178
Their determinations, however, are not bound by any legal prece-
dent." ' Arbitrators' decisions are based on what makes sense under
the circumstances, thereby rendering a sort of rough justice. 8
Requiring written opinions would not only promote greater account-
ability, but also would ensure that arbitrators properly interpret and
apply federal securities statutes. 9
Furthermore, forcing arbitrators to justify their conclusions would
promote accountability and accuracy in decisionmaking which, in
turn, would allow courts to review arbitrators' legal interpretations,
thereby resulting in more effective judicial review of arbitration
decisions." As the Supreme Court in Wilko warned, arbitrators
176. See ULpton, supra note 58, at 899 (concluding that securities customers have had little
choice but to submit all claims to arbitration in wake of McMahon and Rodrigue). After
McMahon and Rodriguer, predispute agreements, which tend to favor arbitration as the primary
forum for these disputes, were routinely enforced. The likelihood of a court deciding a case
arising under the federal securities laws subsequently decreased. See id. at 888 (arguing that
wholesale movement toward arbitration impairs ability of court system to provide precedential
guidance because there are fewer cases litigated).
177. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing that because arbitrators do not need to be lawyers, they are often
unqualified to decide legal issues, and even if they happen to be qualified, they are never bound
by precedent); see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 9, at 85-86 (statement of Theodore
A. Krebsbach) (noting that arbitrators are not constrained by statutory elements, and may issue
awards as equity requires); Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248 (stating that "arbitrators are most
likely not to perform in-depth legal research: their basis for awards generally rest on what is
'fair,' 'just,' or 'sensible' under the circumstances"); G. Richard Shell, ResJudicata and Collateral
Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 633 (1988) (concluding that
arbitrators are not bound by law but instead are free to grant any award that they deem "just
and equitable" under circumstances). For an interesting article discussing the standard that
arbitrators use to reach their decisions see David A. Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base
TheirDecirions: TheSRO'sMustDecide, 16 SEc. REG. LJ. 3 (1988).
178. Arbitration Reform Hearings supra note 12, at 138 (statement of Theodore A. Krebsbach)
(stating that arbitrators do not necessarily know who is being truthful after hearing all evidence,
and as result they "do what makes sense under the circumstances").
179. See Massengale, supra note 99, at 825 (arguing that because arbitrators have assumed
federal courts' role of interpreting federal securities laws, they must be accountable for their
decisions so that courts can determine whether principles developed over 50 years of
jurisprudence have been observed).
180. See Massengale, supra note 99, at 823-25 (discussing Antwine v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
899 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1990), and suggesting that, contrary to court's decision, active judicial
review is essential for development of accurate legal principles); see also supra notes 127-56 and
accompanying text (analyzing need for written decision to promote meaningful review of
arbitration decisions).
19951 WRITEN OPINIONS IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 177
under the federal securities statutes are incapable of determining the
legal meaning of such statutory terms as "burden of proof," "reason-
able care," or "material fact.""8 ' The Court feared that the district
court was incapable of reviewing determinations made by the
arbitrators without a statement of reasons and a record. 2 Today,
interpretations of the legal meaning and effect of the securities laws
are just as complex as such statutory terms. Thus, without a statement
of reasons, courts may experience the same concerns in arbitrators'
abilities. Requiring a written opinion would ensure that the federal
securities laws are interpreted properly, thereby protecting investors
and industry participants by allowing them to pursue claims and assert
defenses adequately.
C. Federal Laws Will Remain Static and Cause Uncertainty Among
Investors
Federal securities laws are constantly evolving to accommodate the
expanding industry. Whereas a judicial opinion permits public
understanding of new developments and their place among the
securities laws, new issues that arise in arbitration cannot be handled
in a consistent and predictable manner without a statement of
reasons. Because arbitrators must resolve disputes involving new areas
like derivatives, a statement of reasons accompanying an arbitration
award would foster common understanding, uniformity, and the
development of new theory.8 3 Likewise, as innovative lawyers
introduce new claims that fit within the parameters of the Exchange
Act, such developments do not spread throughout the industry
because each arbitration is decided individually, without a statement
of reasons to guide future decisions." The lack of guidance from
prior arbitral proceedings has a severe impact on the ability to deter
future fraudulent conduct. In practice, if arbitrators fail to articulate
reasons for their conclusions, the securities laws will not consistently
handle new strains of criminality that do not fit neatly within the
causes of action created by Congress in the securities laws. Such
181. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
182. Id at 436-37.
183. See Hool, supra note 4, at 815-16 (arguing that causes of action under Rule 10(b) are
constantly evolving to include, for example, insider trading and other new issues of fraud, and
without written opinions common law in this area would not continue to evolve); see also Lipton,
supra note 52, at 889 (discussing arbitration's inability to resolve new legal questions because of
loss of consistency and precedent resulting from universal use ofpredispute arbitration clauses).
184. See Hool, supra note 4, at 815-16 (arguing that written opinions, like those developed
in judicial forum, establish valuable precedent necessary for § 10 (b)'s evolution).
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inconsistency in application may reduce the securities laws' deterrent
effect."'
If the lack of guidance provided by arbitration decisions continues,
the credibility of the arbitration system will be jeopardized.
186
Complainants may begin to believe that an arbitrator's failure to give
reasons for a decision indicates an unresolved decision or confusion
about the application of the law. 7 Denying the arbitration system
the means to develop standards with which to guide future decisions
while giving it the important task of enforcing the federal securities
laws, thwarts the very purpose for which arbitration was created.""
Thus, arbitrators should be required to provide a statement of reasons
with an arbitration award.
D. No Assurance That a Subsequent Suit Will Be Precluded
Without the development of common law via written decisions,
there is no guarantee that doctrines such as res judicata (claim
preclusion)8 9 and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)9" will be
185. See Hool, supra note 4, at 816-17 (maintaining that published opinions are essential for
§ 10(b) to accomplish its deterrence function).
186. See Lipton, supra note 52, at 889 (suggesting that credibility problems develop in system
without precedential guidance).
187. See Sobel v. Hertz Warner & Co, 338 F. Supp. 287, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (stating that
parties may interpret arbitrators' failure to give reasons as indecision), reu'd, 469 F.2d 1211 (2d
Cir. 1972). Judge Pollack, the district court judge had argued "that parties who choose
arbitration do not expect a 'legally perfect result' but do expect a rational and judicious
result. A dismissal without a stated rationale may undercut the legitimacy of the process. SobeL
338 F. Supp. at 296-97. Although the Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding, the
appellate court acknowledged thejudge's opinion regarding the implications of a lack of written
reasons. Sobel 469 F.2d at 1214. The appellate court reversed, in part, based on efficiency and
deference to the arbitration process. Id.; see also Hool, supra note 4, at 817 (stating that without
dissemination that comes with fairness of having published opinions, market professionals hear
investor claims may be questioned); infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text (discussing what
long-term impact lack of confidence in arbitration process may have on securities industry).
188. The policy behind the federal securities laws cannot be fulfilled because parties are not
protected and confidence is not created.
189. Seagoing Uniform Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 918,920-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The
test for the application of res judicata is:
(1) whether rights established in prior action would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution
of second action,
(2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the second action,
(3) whether the two suits involved infringement of the same right, and
(4) whether the two suits arose out of the same facts.
Id.
190. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731,733 (1lth Cir. 1982)). Collateral estoppel
is invoked when the
(1) issue at stake is identical to one in preceding litigation;
(2) issue was actually litigated in preceding litigation; and
(3) issue was critical and necessary to prior judgment.
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applicable to subsequent arbitration suits. '~ If an arbitration
hearing is truly considered equal in its binding effect to a court's final
decision, when an arbitration dispute is resolved between two parties,
a subsequent court proceeding between the same parties concerning
the same issues and facts should be barred through res judicata.
A similar principle would seem to apply when a private party, not
involved in prior litigation between two other parties, later sues one
of the parties to the initial action on an issue already resolved by the
arbitrators. The question then is whether the party to the initial
arbitration proceeding may use the arbitrator's findings to collaterally
estop the subsequent party from relitigating the same issue in court.
Until recently, courts generally afforded arbitration awards both res
judicata and collateral estoppel effect. 2 Although it remains
established that a prior arbitration hearing may have res judicata
effect on a subsequent dispute arising out of the same facts and same
parties,9 3 this is not always the case for collateral estoppel.94
191. For discussions of the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel to prior
securities arbitration awards, see SECURmES ARBITRATION 1989, A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO
SEcuRrriEs ARBrrRATION 241-46 (1989); Durrer, supra note 2, at 353-54 n.101; C. Edward
Fletcher III, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act, Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon
World, 37 EMORY LJ. 99, 116-22 (1988); C. Edward Fletcher III, Privatizing Securities Disputes
Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393,431-35 (1987); Shell, supra
note 177, at 639-75; Willingham, supra note 12, at 427-32.
192. See Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 30-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that
arbitrator's decision collaterally estopped court from hearing investor's allegations of violations
of federal securities laws and libel);James L. Saphier Agency v. Green, 190 F. Supp. 713, 718-21
(S.D.N.Y.) (concluding that arbitrator's decision was res judicata and plaintiff was collaterally
estopped from relitigating issues), aft'd, 293 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1961). For a discussion of
these and other issues, see Privatizing Securities Disputes, supra note 191, at 432.
193. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985)
(stating that resjudicata can apply to arbitration awards); Shell, supra note 177, at 641 & n.93
(stating that courts have long understood that arbitration decisions can have resjudicata effect)
(citing NewYork Lumber & Wood-Working v. Schneider, 24 N.E. 4 (1890) and Brazil v. Isham,
12 N.Y. 9 (1854)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 84 (1982) providing that
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3), and (4), a valid and final award by
arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same
exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.
(2) An award by arbitration with respect to a claim does not preclude relitigation of
the same or a related claim based on the same transaction if a scheme of remedies
permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the award regarding the first
claim.
(3) A determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude relitigation of that
issue if-
(a) According preclusive effect to determination of the issue would be
incompatible with a legal policy or contractual provision that the tribunal in which the
issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent determination of the issue
in question, or with a purpose of the arbitration agreement that the arbitration be
specially expeditious; or
(b) The procedure leading to the award lacked the elements of adjudicatory
procedure prescribed in § 83(2).
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The already uncertain preclusive effect of issues decided by
arbitrators is exaggerated by the arbitrators' practice of granting only
one-line awards. 95 The absence of collateral estoppel in arbitration
may have several repercussions. First, arbitration findings may be
duplicated thereby wasting both arbitration and court participants'
time. 9 ' Second, the party being sued for the second time will be
forced to waste resources by repeatedly defending its position."
Last, the finality of arbitration would be compromised.'
(4) If the terms of an agreement to arbitrate limit the binding effect of the award
in another adjudication or arbitration proceeding, the extent to which the award has
conclusive effect is determined in accordance with that limitation.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 84 (1982).
195. See Tamari v. Bache & Co., 637 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-37 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (refusing to
invoke collateral estoppel because one-line award did not reveal whether defendant or affiliated
company, who was not party, had committed alleged wrongs); Ufheil Constr. Co. v. Town of New
Windsor, 478 F. Supp. 766, 768-69 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel to any
of alleged breaches of construction contract because court could not determine which provisions
had formed basis for arbitration award because arbitrators did not state which provisions had
been breached), afrid 636 F.2d 1204 (1980); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 222 (1985) (stating that "it is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any
preclusive effect on the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims"). The doubt regarding the
preclusive effect of arbitration may require some reformulating in light of more recent Supreme
Court cases. See Rodriguez de Qujas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481-82
(1989) (holding that because Arbitration Act favors arbitration, courts are required to
"rigorously enforce" pre-dispute agreements); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987) (enforcing arbitration agreement under Securities Act and stating
that courts are not required to resolve such claims). Collectively, these cases not only signaled
the end of most judicial due process litigation of securities disputes but they also negated the
arguments raised against resjudicata and collateral estoppel in arbitration.
Much of the debate about res judicata and collateral estoppel in arbitration dealt with a
bigger underlying issue-the denial of parties' right to redress their grievances in the court
system. See Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (holding parties could not be forced to
waive their right to judicial proceeding prior to dispute), overruled by Rodriguez de Qujas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The due process question was raised
in Wilko because arbitration lacked manyjudicial safeguards. But now that the Supreme Court
has held that arbitration is an adequate method of resolving securities disputes and demanded
that all predispute arbitration agreements be enforced, see Rodrigu, de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485-
86, almost every broker/dealer dispute will be handled in arbitration. Seesupra note 71 (arguing
that the combination of McMahon and Rodrigue decisions will direct all claims arising out of
predispute arbitration agreements to arbitration). Thus, the underlying arguments raised
against applying resjudicata and collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions seem to have lost
weight. As a result, this change in attitude may cause arbitration awards to have greater
preclusive effect.
196. It is wasteful for participants to adjudicate the same issue twice simply because it is in
a different forum. For a discussion of collateral estoppel, see supra note 191.
197. Resources wasted include the litigants' and the taxpayers' money used to operate the
courts. See generally National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Securities Regulation in the United
States (1992) (addressing costs included in arbitration).
198. One of the attractive features of arbitration is that time is saved without sacrificing
finality. SeeNASD Rules § 41(b) (stating that "all awards ordered pursuant to this code shall be
deemed final and not subject to review or appeal"). If arbitration is merely duplicated, the
result would be an increase in time and money. Inevitably, arbitration without finality offers less
advantages for participants.
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Nevertheless, a court is unable to hold that arbitration awards are
legally binding without a statement of reasons. For example, in O'Neil
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith," the court refused to invoke
collateral estoppel of an arbitration award because, without a written
opinion, the court could not determine whether the arbitrator had
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and
convincing evidence standard.2" Other courts have used similar
reasoning.2 ' Requiring written opinions would reduce the ineffi-
cient, duplicative expenditure of resources by affording all arbitration
awards final and binding effect. As one author stated, "The preclusive
effect of arbitration will increase as better records of arbitration
proceedings are kept and more detailed awards opinions are
written."0 2 Many courts simply refuse to infer which issues were
and which were not decided by the arbitrators; requiring a statement
of reasons to accompany an arbitration award would allow arbitration
to be the binding tool it was created to be.
20 3
V. PoLIcY REASONS FOR REQUIRING WRITTEN OPINIONS
A. Requiring Written Opinions Would Not Cause the Problems Predicted
Commentators who oppose a requirement that arbitrators include
a written reasoned decision with arbitration awards have advanced
numerous arguments in support of their position. Opponents
contend that requiring a written opinion would compromise the
efficiency of arbitration,"°4 discourage qualified individuals from
serving as arbitrators,0 5 reduce the confidentiality associated with
arbitration,0 6 and create unnecessary work because most disputes
involve simple factual and legal issues.' °7 To the contrary, however,
a statement of reasons would more effectively promote the policy
199. 654 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Iil. 1987).
200. O'Neil v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 654 F. Supp. 347, 352-53 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
201. See supra note 195 (discussing cases where courts refused to apply collateral estoppel
when arbitrators had not issued written decisions).
202. Willingham, supra note 12, at 432.
203. See NASD Rules § 41(b) (stating that "all awards rendered pursuant to this code shall
be deemed final and not subject to review or appeal").
204. See supra note 92 (arguing that efficiency will be reduced with statement of reasons).
205. See infra note 237 (discussing idea that written opinions will discourage arbitrators).
206. See infra note 255 (stating that confidentiality of arbitration may be compromised with
written opinion).
207. See supra note 116 (suggesting that typical broker disputes involve simple factual issues
for which written opinion is unnecessary).
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underlying the federal securities laws both by reducing bias in the
system and restoring the credibility of the securities markets.
208
1. Effwiency
Commentators argue that requiring arbitrators to write opinions
would compromise the efficiency of the arbitration process. 09 This
argument stems from arbitration's original purpose-to exist as an
inexpensive and expeditious alternative to the courts.2 "0  The logic
of the argument has two main parts. First, opponents suggest that
written opinions would unnecessarily waste time, money, and
effort 211  Second, opponents argue that written opinions would
provide opportunities for the losing party to attack the outcome of
the arbitration, thereby converting arbitration into "the commence-
ment, not the end, of litigation."
a. Waste of time, effort, and money
Commentators argue that, while arbitration lacks procedural
safeguards present in court proceedings,13 participants agree to
arbitrate, fully appreciating the implications of their decision. 14
Commentators argue that parties resort to arbitration to receive a
quick, efficient, and less costly, though less legally precise, settlement
of their dispute.2 15  They conclude that a written opinion as a
208. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing policy behind federal securities
laws).
209. See supra note 92 (discussing proposition that efficiency of arbitration will suffer if
statement of reasons is required).
210. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (stating intent that arbitration be efficient
alternative to courts).
211. See supra note 92 (discussing notion that money and time will be wasted if statement of
reasons is required).
212. San Martine Compania de Navegacion, SA v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796,
800 (9th Cir. 1961) (citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854)); see also
Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 100 (statement of Theodore A. Krebsbach) (arguing
that unlimited appeals would allow parties to unilaterally extend proceedings).
213. See In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (commenting on lack of legal
precision inherent in arbitration); Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 53 (statement of
Theodore G. Eppenstein) (arguing that arbitration benefits must be balanced against loss of
constitutional rights to due process; trial byjury; finding of facts and conclusions of law; federal
pleading, discovery, and evidentiary rules; risk of collateral estoppel; and appeal).
214. See Deborah B. Oliver, Arbitration of Securities Claims: Polity Considerations for Keeping
Investor-Broker Disputes Out of Court, 1987 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 527, 541-46 (1987) (discussing
investors' vulnerability to brokers' overreaching). There is some evidence demonstrating that
investors do not voluntarily choose to arbitrate but instead are compelled to arbitrate by
predispute agreements, a reflection of the securities industry personnel's bargaining power. Id.
215. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 83-84 (statement of Theodore A.
Krebsbach) (noting that arbitration's advantages over litigation include lower costs, speed, and
efficient management of litigation's elements).
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procedural safeguard is neither desirable nor necessary because
investors voluntarily choose to sacrifice more specific procedures for
greater efficiency.216 According to this logic, requiring a written
opinion would waste both time and resources, resulting in inefficient
proceedings.
b. Revealing areas for attack by losing parties
Another efficiency argument that opponents raise posits that written
opinions would enable losing parties to attack the decision and
thereby convert arbitration into the first step in a long process of
dispute resolution.217 Commentators suggest that many arbitrators
are neither lawyers nor trained legal experts.1 ' Instead, they are
arbitrators because of their sound business judgment. 1 9 If such
non-lawyer arbitrators are required to write decisions, opponents
argue, then the losing party, in its appeal to a court, could target less
legally precise aspects of the opinion as proof of injustice.220 They
contend that this would equate arbitration with the court process in
terms of duration and ultimately reduce the advantages of arbitral
forums.
221
2. Written opinions would not compromise the efficiency of arbitration
The efficiency arguments advanced by opponents fail to explain
how a written opinion would significantly add to the time or cost of
arbitration hearings. Their argument assumes the fact to be proven.
The reality is that parties need written opinions and such opinions
would neither waste time and money222 nor convert arbitration into
the first step in complex dispute resolution.22
216. This assumes that written opinions serve only as a procedural safeguard. See infra text
accompanying notes 278-94 (discussing idea that written opinions promote policy behind
securities laws).
217. San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796,
800 (9th Cir. 1961).
218. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 99 (statement of Theodore A.
Krebsbach); Shell, supra note 177, at 631.
219. Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248.
220. Hermann, supra note 124, at 715; Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 53-54
(statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein).
221. See Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 484-85 (1981) (arguing that requiring written opinions
would result in loss of arbitration's advantages).
222. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text (arguing that written opinions would
improve investor confidence without increasing time or money).
223. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (arguing that finality ofarbitration will not
be altered with written opinion).
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a. Written opinions would not waste time, money, and resources
A written opinion would not compromise the efficiency of
arbitration by wasting time, money, or resources. Instead, such
opinions would increase public confidence in the arbitration process
and improve the overall integrity of the system. Many participants in
arbitration do not knowingly forgo the procedural safeguards inherent
in the court system for greater efficiency in arbitration.224 In fact,
evidence suggests that some parties are dissatisfied with the arbitration
process and believe that it does not adequately protect their
rights.2" Such discontent with the arbitral process recently sparked
the formation of the NASD Task Force to reevaluate arbitration
procedures. 26 Requiring arbitrators to provide a summary of
reasons for their decisions is precisely the procedural safeguard
needed to reform public opinion about the perceived fairness and
costs of the failing arbitration system.227
Furthermore, a brief or informal statement of reasons accompany-
ing an arbitration award would not significantly add to the costs or
the time required for hearings. Neither costs nor time would increase
because, during deliberations, arbitrators already openly discuss their
opinions regarding issues and arguments raised by the parties.228
Given that deliberations typically involve a broad exchange of ideas
224. See supra note 214 (stating that some parties to arbitration are compelled to agree to
arbitrate).
225. In Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1141 (1986), ChiefJudge Lay argued that despite the historical reputation of arbitration
as a simple, inexpensive, and expeditious means of dispute resolution, parties resorting to
arbitration are discovering not only that the process is complex, expensive, and time consuming,
but that the results are much different than the "fairer" results achieved in court. Id. at 751
n.12. These "private and untrained 'judges,'" he argued, are unable to apply the law
appropriately. Id. Justice Blackmun also recently questioned the efficiency of arbitration in his
dissent in McMahon, arguing that arbitration's effectiveness has not improved since the days of
Wilko v. Swan. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noticing that as in the days of Wiko, written opinions and records
are not required, arbitrators are not bound by precedent, and judicial review remains severely
limited); see also Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986
DuKE LJ. 548,552-54 (comparing arbitration's reduced evidentiary rules, substantive differences,
lack of discovery rules, and limited judicial review with those of courts).
226. SEC Head to Chair Task Force, supra note 82; Khalfani, supra note 84, at A5A.
227. For a comparison of costs and time efficiency of arbitration and litigation, see
Hermann, supra note 124, at 707 (discussing Delloitte, Haskins & Sells survey performed per
NYSE's request). Although arbitration remains less costly than a full court hearing, it is hardly
inexpensive. Essentially, the Delloitte survey revealed that the average arbitration costs $8,000
as compared to $20,000 for a court proceeding. Id. Additionally, the average arbitration takes
434 days as compared to 599 days for a court hearing. "While this data does show a pronounced
difference, one would expect arbitration, for all its supposed 'speed,' to be even faster." Id.
228. See supra note 10 (discussing typical arbitration as it proceeds to award).
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and conclusions,229 it is unlikely that a one to three paragraph
written summary of reasons would add significantly to the costs and
time needed for the hearing. While a complex legal opinion is not
necessary, some written indication of why one party prevailed over the
other would be a step toward procedural and substantive fairness
without unnecessarily wasting time, money, or resources.
b. Written opinions would not reveal areas for attack by losing
parties
Opponents of written opinions suggest that written opinions will
convert arbitration into a series of legal proceedings by unveiling
avenues for appeal.2" It can also be persuasively argued, however,
that routine written opinions would not create new tactics for appeal.
For example, requiring a written opinion would not change the
finality of arbitration.231 Specifically, arbitration will remain bind-
ing, 2 subject to being vacated only through the limited processes
permitted by section 10 of the Arbitration Act 233  In all situations
in which arbitration decisions can not be vacated, courts will still be
forced to defer to arbitrators' judgment.2" Requiring written
opinions, therefore, would not create new avenues for appeal.
Written opinions instead would enable courts to properly apply the
limited judicial review that Congress intended for arbitration.33
229. SeeRobert S. Clemente, SecuritiesArbitrator Training. ManagingtheArbitration Process 17-20
(New York Stock Exchange, 1992-94). Clemente describes the deliberation procedure in his
manual outlining the basic principles of the arbitrator training process. Deliberations begin
immediately after the hearing is concluded. Id. at 18. Arbitrators are advised to speak openly
about their opinions of the issues and to consistently consider the factual and legal arguments
raised by the parties. Id Once a decision is reached by a majority of arbitrators, the award is
prepared. Id. at 19.
230. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (criticizing appellate procedures because of
likelihood that proceeding would be extended).
231. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing courts' limited ability to review
and vacate arbitrators' decisions).
232. NASD Rules § 41(b).
233. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
234. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting courts' deference to arbitration
decisions).
235. See supra notes 127-56 and accompanying text (discussing need for meaningful review
of arbitration decisions). Written opinions would enable courts to determine effectively whether
arbitrators were biased or committed fraud, mistake, or other errors by having the relevant facts
before them. Id
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3. The services of qualified arbitrators
a. Qualified arbitrators would be discouraged from serving
Opponents of written opinions argue that if courts target areas for
appeal in arbitration decisions, many qualified arbitrators would be
discouraged from serving.236  Commentators are concerned that
arbitrators would fear becoming involved in lengthy legal disputes that
may ultimately place blame on an arbitrator for bias or mistake.3 7
Such unfavorable attention, they assert, would irreparably taint the
arbitrator's reputation in the business community.2 8  Thus, oppo-
nents contend that qualified individuals would be discouraged from
serving as arbitrators.
b. Qualified arbitrators would not be discouraged from serving
The argument that qualified arbitrators would be deterred from
service assumes that arbitrators' opinions can easily be attacked.3 9
The arbitral forum confers immense authority on arbitrators and
courts struggle to uphold this authority.20 Moreover, arbitrators
enjoy substantial immunity from liability. Therefore, fear of liability
is not likely to deter individuals from serving as arbitrators.
241
Arbitrators are exempt, for example, from liability for failure to use
care or skill.2' They are not exempt, however, when their conduct
constitutes fraud or other misconduct for which the law provides a
penalty.243 Given arbitrators' broad immunity from liability, it is not
236. See Zanglier, supra note 99, at 696 (noting SEC's concern that requiring publication of
reasons would "'discourage potential arbitrators from serving'" (quoting Securities Arbitration:
McMahon, Rodriquz, and Beyond, 22 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. (S&P) No. 20, at 218 (Nov. 22,
1989))); see also SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151-52 (arguing that benefits of requiring
written opinions do not outweigh concerns about slowing down arbitration process and
discouraging arbitrators from serving).
237. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151-52.
238. SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151.
239. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text (discussing insulation of arbitration
decisions from judicial scrutiny due to limited availability of vacatur and widespread deference
by appellate courts).
240. See supra note 136 (citing cases that note high degree of judicial deference given to
arbitration decisions).
241. SECUP.nES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION (SICA), ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 32
(May 1992) [hereinafter SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL].
242. SICA ARBIRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 242.
243. SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 242. Bribery is an example of the type of
misconduct for which arbitrators are held responsible. See SICA ARBrrRATORS MANUAL, supra
note 242.
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arbitrators that may be deterred. Instead, private parties may be
deterred from suing arbitrators as they must meet a difficult burden:
proving that the arbitrator's conduct was fraudulent.
Moreover, the arbitration process may actually benefit if some
arbitrators are discouraged from serving. As one author suggests, bias
is often sustained in a system that does not require a statement of
reasons to accompany an award." The author further contends
that arbitrators may have bias because they are "judges" specifically
chosen by and paid by the parties themselves to resolve their dis-
putes." Instead of deciding between right and wrong, it is argued,
arbitrators often render compromise awards to satisfy the parties with
the hope they will be chosen to arbitrate subsequent suits.21
Economic reward is not the only plausible explanation for
compromise awards. 4 Other benefits, such as preserving a business
relationship, may help explain the phenomenon.' Additionally,
compromise awards can be attributed to the failure of arbitrators to
reach a unanimous conclusion regarding the reasons for allowing a
particular party to prevail. 49 In any event, requiring written opin-
ions would decrease compromise awards because arbitrators would
fear vacatur for bias or partiality.2 ° As a result, parties may retain
arbitrators who are more honest, qualified, and less influenced by
selfish temptations. 2 1 This result would not be destructive to the
process, but instead would preserve the integrity of arbitration as an
efficient alternative to the court process.
244. Shell, supra note 177, at 634.
245. Shell, supra note 177, at 634.
246. Shell, supra note 177, at 634. An example of a compromise award is one in which
neither party wins. Instead, the award appeases both parties by affording each some sort of
victory.
247. An arbitrator typically earns around $150 per day, which is often only $20 per hour.
Interview with Egon Guttman, supra note 20.
248. See Shell, supra note 177, at 634 (suggesting that some arbitrators may render
compromise awards in order to preserve outside business relationships). Since many arbitrators
are themselves business people, they may not want to find against a party that they do business
with. In such a situation, a compromise award may save the business relationship.
249. See SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151 (describing phenomenon of arbitrators
reaching consensus regarding damage award before agreeing on grounds for award).
250. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing both grounds for which
district court can vacate arbitration award under Arbitration Act and judicially created manifest
disregard standard).
251. See Shell, supra note 177, at 634 (suggesting that arbitrators who render compromise
awards may do so out of pecuniary interest).
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4. Confidentiality
a. Decline in confidentiality
Other opponents of requiring written opinions25 2 insist that the
confidential nature of arbitration, which has historically been a private
forum,253 would be sacrificed if arbitrators are forced to issue
published, written opinions.2-4 The loss of privacy, opponents argue,
may deter parties from suing due to a fear of being labeled by the
investing community as a fickle, litigious investor.55
b. Confidentiality would not be compromised unless essential to
preserve the proper functioning of the arbitration process
Commentators fail to address why confidentiality is a favored aspect
of arbitration. The fact that arbitration proceedings have always been
conducted privately is not dispositive. Even if confidentiality is a
desired goal, there is no evidence that mandating written opinions
would eliminate that end. First, each individual SRO would likely
have its own practice; some may require the release of the parties'
and arbitrators' names while others may not. In fact, a typical
predispute arbitration clause enables the parties to choose among
numerous arbitral forums."6 Individual parties could, therefore,
252. SEC Staff Suggests Arbitration Group Adopt Use of One-Page Award Statement, 20 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 559, 559 (Apr. 15, 1988).
253. See SICA ARBrIRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 242, at 32-33 (detailing confidentiality of
all aspects of arbitration).
254. SEC Staff Suggests Arbitration Group Adopt Use of One-Page Award Statement, supra note 252,
at 559; see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 102 (statement of Theodore A.
Krebsbach) (suggesting that both claimants and respondents may object to public disclosure);
SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,152 (reporting SEC's decision to preserve confidential nature
of arbitration hearings).
255. Such investors may be blacklisted from the investment community because brokers may
not want to open a new account for a client with a reputation for being a complaining, fickle
investor.
256. See Wallace, supra note 115, at 1203 n.12. The following is an example of a typical
predispute arbitration agreement:
The undersigned agrees, and by carrying an account for the undersigned you agree,
that except as inconsistent with the foregoing sentence, all controrversies which may arise
between us concerning any transaction or the construction, performance or breach of this or any
other agreement between us, whether entered into prior, on, or subsequent to the date hereof, shall
be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the Board of Governors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., or the Board of Governors of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., as
you may elect. If you do not make such election by registered mail addressed to (the
brokerage firm's legal and compliance department in New York City], within five days
after demand by [the brokerage firm] that you make such election, then (the
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contract for the right to arbitrate in a forum that protects their
unique interests.
Moreover, recent changes to arbitration rules have already reduced
arbitration's confidential nature. 7 For example, recent amend-
ments make it easier for parties in large and complex disputes to
receive written findings and conclusions, and summary arbitration
data is now required.2" These changes sacrifice some confidentiali-
ty for the greater goals of clarity and fairness. 9 Evidence suggests
that releasing the names of arbitrators would not only promote
greater accountability in decisionmaking,2' but it would also
decrease arbitrators' tendency to deliver excessive awards"' by
instilling fear that courts will vacate awards.262 Additionally, it would
enable parties to discover arbitrators' potential predispositions.
2 3
Lastly, releasing claimants' names, in addition to those of arbitrators,
may allow opposing parties and presiding arbitrators to expose
frivolous suits by noticing trends of investor harassment.
5. Simple issues
a. Typical disputes involve simple issues
Finally, opponents argue that written opinions are unnecessary
because typical disputes involve simple factual issues, not complex
legal interpretations. 264  This argument assumes that written opin-
ions serve only to clarify decisions. In fact, clarification is only one
brokerage firm] may make such election. Judgment upon any award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Id. (emphasis in original).
257. See supra Part ll.B (discussing recent amendments to arbitration rules).
258. See supra Part II.B (discussing recent amendments to arbitration rules).
259. Rules Changed, supra note 107. For large and complex disputes, the documents and
award statement would be made public. Id Summary award statements will not be published
but will be readily available in individual SRO reference rooms. NYSEProposesHighlightingRights,
Providing Summay Data on Arbitrations, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1783 (Nov. 25,
1988).
260. See Massengale, supranote 99, at 825 n.33 and accompanying text (asserting that greater
accountability is needed for arbitrators and citing supporting journal articles).
261. See Hermann, supra note 124, at 715 (arguing that written opinions would deter
"emotionally-driven equitable awards").
262. See9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); see also supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (examining
court's ability to vacate arbitration awards under manifest disregard standard).
263. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing manifest disregard standard
and vacating awards).
264. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 99-100 (statement of Theodore A.
Kresbach) (arguing that vast majority of arbitrations involve factual determinations of whether
broker defrauded client).
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benefit to be derived from written opinions.2 Opponents argue
further that arbitrators do not make law, but only solve typical
disputes between parties, which generally involve money or property
rights.2" Thus, arbitrators are effective because they apply their
sound commercial judgment.2 67 In fact, opponents offer evidence
that under the circumstances involved in a typical dispute, arbitrators'
failure to write opinions may actually benefit the complaining investor
by reducing the formality of the proceeding.2" Requiring written
opinions in simple disputes, commentators conclude, is unnecessary
and would merely waste valuable time and money.269
b. Written opinions are needed and would promote the intent behind
the securities laws
The logic that written opinions are unnecessary because arbitrated
disputes ordinarily involve clear factual issues is flawed for two
reasons. First, arbitrators are often called upon to render complex
damage awards that incorporate punitive damages.27° Punitive
damages punish the offender while concurrently deterring others who
might subsequently engage in the harmful activity.2 7' These damag-
es supplement compensatory damages by redressing the reckless and
oppressive nature of the act.272  Written opinions are essential
because if present and future offenders do not know why punitive
damages have been awarded, they will be unable to correct their
conduct.
Arbitrators' ability to award punitive damages, however, has
historically been debated.273 In fact, until the 1995 decision of
265. See infra notes 283-94 and accompanying text (discussing additional benefits derived
from requiring written opinions).
266. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing simple, factual nature of most
arbitrations).
267. Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248-49.
268. See Wallace, supra note 115, at 1248-49 (noting effects of fewer technical pleading
requirements and more responsive approach to alleged broker misconduct); see also Hermann,
supra note 124, at 707 (arguing that investors benefit from less formal nature of arbitration
proceedings) (citing Hood, supra note 75, at 584). But see infra note 288 (suggesting that
investors may prevail but not to extent they feel they are entitled to recover).
269. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting that most arbitrations involve simple
factual situations); SEC Order, supra note 101, at 21,151-52 (arguing that requiring written
opinions would slow down arbitration process).
270. Interview with Egon Guttman, supra note 20. See generally Margaret Pedrick Sullivan,
Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TuL L. REv. 1113 (1988).
271. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965).
272. 22 AM.JuR. 2D Damages § 731 (1988).
273. See Sullivan, supra note 270, at 1130 (noting lack of uniformity among states regarding
availability of punitive damages in arbitral forum). Compare Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that arbitrator lacks authority to award punitive damages even
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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,274 the Supreme Court
had not expressly authorized arbitrators to assign such awards.275
In Mastrobuono, the Court held that arbitrators may grant punitive
damages, under New York law, when consistent with the terms of a
contractual agreement, even though New York state law affords only
courts this power. 6 The Mastrobuono decision accentuates the need
for written arbitration opinions because arbitrators consistently deliver
substantial punitive damage awards. Accordingly, the arbitral forum's
proper functioning demands mandatory written opinions.
Second, the argument that written opinions are unnecessary
because most disputes involve simple issues fails to consider Congress'
intent in formulating the federal securities laws. 77 This argument
seems to be based on the assumption that written opinions only serve
to explain complex legal and factual issues, an assumption that is
incorrect. Small investors, like large corporations involved in large
and complex disputes2 8 deserve an explanation of why arbitrators
granted judgment for or against them. Congress' goal behind the
securities laws of promoting investor protection and increasing
confidence in the markets demands such an accounting.
2 7 9
Congress passed the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to protect
investors from securities industry abuse. These Acts sought to
promote full and fair disclosure and restore confidence in the
securities industry.28 Furthermore, via the Federal Arbitration Act,
Congress sought to provide a fair tribunal for complainants to redress
their rights. 281 An arbitration award that does not require a state-
ment of reasons may fail to advance the policy of either the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act. The securities laws may be thwarted
because investor confidence may not be fostered. Similarly, the
Federal Arbitration Act may be defeated because the arbitral forum
may not be a fair and efficient alternative to the courts.
where agreed upon by parties) with Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993) (maintaining that
arbitrators may award punitive damages under federal law).
274. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
275. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 n.7 (1995).
276. Id at 1219. For a discussion of the ability of arbitrators to award punitive damages
under New York law prior to Mastrobuono, see Hood, supra note 75, at 579-81.
277. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing policy behind securities laws).
278. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing in detail innovation for large
and complex disputes).
279. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing policy behind Securities Act and
Exchange Act).
280. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing policy behind Securities Act and
Exchange Act).
281. Seesupra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing policy behindArbitration Act).
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B. Written Opinions Would Provide Better Protection for Investors
1. Present investors
A present investor who seeks to redress his or her rights through
arbitration often feels "psychologically unsatisfied" without a statement
of reasons accompanying the award.282 The current rule destroys
investors' perceptions of having had their fair day in court or,
alternatively, their fair day in arbitration.2 a For example, on a
typical new account form,2" potential investors must identify their
investment objectives. Investment objectives are ranked on a
continuum from income to investment grade to growth to specula-
tion, with income representing the lowest risk and speculation, the
highest.2" Suppose that A, a typical investor, opens an account
wanting a moderately risky investment. Accordingly, A chooses
investment grade as the investment objective. Later, following a
sudden increase in income, A changes the investment objective to
speculation.
Throughout the entire investment period, A's investment declines
and A suffers a total loss of $10,000. A then alleges that security X
was unsuitable for A and that broker B is liable for giving inappropri-
ate advice which caused A ultimately to purchase a speculation
security."' A seeks $10,000 in compensation for this unsuitable and
282. Interview with Egon Guttman, supra note 20.
283. The hypothetical was derived from a combination of conversations with Egon Guttman
and case law involving claims of unsuitability. Interview with Egon Guttman, supra note 20; see,
e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 131-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
evidence could not support finding that limited partners have relied on Hutton's assurances of
suitability); O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 900 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
unsuitability claim not proven because no basis to conclude broken intentionally or recklessly
defrauded client); Franks v. Cavanaugh, 711 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding investor
failed to show that securities purchased were unsuitable).
284. SeePaineWebberIncorporated Business Trust/NewAccountForm [hereinafterBusiness
Trust/New Account Form] (on file with The American University Law Review). An investor must
provide a broker with a variety of information upon opening a new account at a brokerage firm.
Such information includes: general personal information, fiduciary information, trading history,
power of attorney, investment objectives, and net worth. Id.
285. Business Trust/New Account Form, supra note 284.
286. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978). An
investor has three ways to pursue a claim of unsuitability. Id. First, investors can allege a
violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Second,
investors can claim a breach of fiduciary duty. Third, investors can allege a violation of NYSE
Rule 425, the "know your customer" rule. Id. Under any of these options, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) that the security purchased was not suited to the buyer's investment objectives, (2)
that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the security was unsuitable for
the buyer, (3) that the defendant nevertheless recommended or purchased the unsuited
security, (4) that the defendant acted with scienter, and (5) that the buyer reasonably relied on
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inappropriately high risk investment. The suit proceeds to an
arbitration hearing at which A is awarded only $5,000 because the
arbitrator discovered that A changed his investment objective to
speculation during a period of the security's decline. During the
period thatA had an objective of investment grade, A lost only $5,000
and, therefore, the arbitration award reflects only this amount.
Once A changed the objective to speculation, the initial investment
advice rendered by the broker corresponded to A's desire for a
moderately risky investment. Without a written explanation from the
arbitrators who awarded A the money, A is left feeling cheated and
psychologically unsatisfied."7  Investor A may not recall changing
objectives or, alternatively, may fail to see the reasoning that the
arbitrators used to reach their decision. As a result, A fails to
understand why the award did not cover the full $10,000 loss. A
leaves the arbitration hearing feeling cheated. Ultimately, A may lose
confidence in the "proper and fair" functioning of the securities
market.2" Such a result directly contradicts Congress' and the
Supreme Court's mandate.
2. Future investors
The protections afforded to future investors, as required by the
securities laws, also are inadequate absent a statement of reasons
accompanying arbitration awards. Recall that the original objective
of the Securities Act was to remedy abuses that occurred during the
1929 market crash.2 9  This Act was specifically created to protect
investors by promoting full and fair disclosure. Accordingly, in order
to make informed decisions regarding whether to invest with a certain
broker, brokerage firm, or in a certain bond fund, future buyers need
full and fair disclosure of how arbitrators previously resolved certain
issues. Investors are simply unable to make informed decisions
without reviewing written opinions of prior arbitration hearings which
affect the area they wish to pursue. Furthermore, investors may
defendant to its detriment. Id.
287. For another illustration of the results of this phenomenon, see Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 261 n.20 (1987) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (suggesting
that statistics showing that investors are favored in arbitration are misleading because of failure
to account for damages received in relation to amount to which investors felt they were
entitled).
288. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 64 (statement of Theodore G.
Eppenstein) (suggesting that proposals to enhance arbitration's fairness should be seriously
considered because public confidence in marketplace, along with American ideal that disputes
should be fairly handled, are at stake).
289. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77bbbb (1994)).
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question the securities industry's credibility if they attribute the
arbitrators' failure to provide reasons for their awards to confusion
and an inability to arrive at a valid decision." ° Ultimately, investors
may conclude that the securities market is not a safe place to invest
their money.
3. Implications for the entire securities industry
Over time, the fears of present and future investors may culminate
in an overall decline in investments in the securities industry.
Investor confidence is essential to the successful operation of the
securities markets and "if we destroy the breadth of the marketplace
by alienating individual participants, we may endanger the capital
formation process so basic to our financial way of life."
291
Investors already have the overall impression that their claims are
being heard in a forum composed of individuals sympathetic to the
securities industry.29 2 This belief, combined with the stereotype that
the securities industry is composed of wealthy, greedy, and devious
businesspersons, will likely cause investor confidence, which Congress
sought to revive with the federal securities laws, to become obsolete.
Eventually, current and potential securities buyers may invest in other
financial markets that they believe to be more credible and depend-
able. An industry that neither inspires the confidence of investors nor
offers guarantees of protection will lose a vital source of capital.2 93
To the extent that arbitration does not support the goals of the
federal securities laws, the rules need to be reformed.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NASD TASK FORCE
Arbitration is a valuable tool to facilitate the handling of securities
disputes. Written opinions would not alter the unique and favored
aspects of the forum. Instead, written opinions would enable
arbitration to continue to be the efficient and economically conserva-
tive alternative that it was created to be. NASD Rules § 41, NYSE Rule
627, AMEX Rule 618, and AAA Rules § 42, which focus on the
290. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing potential loss of credibility in
securities industry).
291. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at I (statement of Hon. EdwardJ. Markey).
This remark referred primarily to the issuing of securities, not trading, which normally results
in arbitration. Id. In the context of this article, however, the overall message seems to apply
to trading securities as well.
292. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,260-61 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
293. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 12, at 1 (statement of Hon. EdwardJ. Markey)
(voicing concern that alienating individual investors will result in loss of basic capital formation
process necessary to U.S. economy).
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content of the award statement, all should be amended to include the
following:
I. Arbitrators shall be required, in all situations, to write a
statement of reasons which will accompany their award except as
provided in section 1(a);
(a)When both parties to the arbitration shall consent, the
arbitrator shall not be required to write a statement of reasons.
(b)Arbitrators shall use their sound business judgment to decide
arbitration decisions and be required to include this business
judgment in writing the opinion. If, in reaching their decisions,
arbitrators relied on legal precedent, statute, or another legal
authority, arbitrators shall be required to include the authority
relied upon and how it served as precedent.
The proposed amendment to the aforementioned rules would
establish a per se rule whereby arbitrators would be required to
provide a written opinion with their decisions. Such an opinion,
however, could be waived with the consent of both parties. By
amending the rules in this manner, securities regulators could ade-
quately protect both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
Ordinary investors will be protected because they will know why they
were victorious or why they were not. They will better understand the
implications of investing and hopefully, via written decisions, become
more knowledgeable about the markets. This result is entirely
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the securities laws.
Additionally, institutional investors and securities industry personnel,
who are typically more sophisticated, will realize that arbitration
disputes frequently involve few complex legal issues. These sophisti-
cated investors will get the result they desire from arbitration without
excess time or money expended by arbitrators. This result is also
consistent with the protection that Congress intended the federal
securities laws to provide. Together, both unsophisticated and
sophisticated investors would retain confidence in the securities
industry by sensing that the arbitral forums have their unique interests
in mind.2 9
While arbitrators should be required to write opinions, they should
not be required to write complex legal opinions. Such a requirement
would contradict the Arbitration Act's goals by equalizing the
procedural aspects of arbitration and those of the courts.295 Arbitra-
294. See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text (discussing need for confidence in order
to maintain integrity of markets).
295. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Lipton, supra note 177 (arguing that SROs
must decide whether arbitrators should use their legal or commercial judgment); Hermann,
supra note 124, at 715-16 (discussing possibility of different standards employed by different
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tors should be required, however, to write reasoned factual determina-
tions which include any precedent relied on to reach the decision.
Requiring factual determinations would facilitate courts' meaningful
review of awards to check for arbitrator bias or error,29 especially
when a court is reviewing punitive damage awards.297 Factual
opinions would also generate customs and practices in
decisionmaking which would result in more uniformity and predict-
ability among arbitration awards.29 Although arbitration awards
would not have precedential value, the creation of a consistent body
of factual and occasionally legal determinations would incorporate
changing norms, standards, and practices for future generations to
follow.29 For all of the aforementioned reasons, the SROs should
incorporate written opinions into the rules governing their forums.
CONCLUSION
A written opinion requirement could be achieved in a number of
ways. First, this Comment introduced a method that would allow
individual SROs to reform the arbitration rules governing their forum.
In fact, the innovations for large and complex disputes and the
summary arbitration data suggest that the SROs are already moving
in that direction by facilitating the exchange of information between
arbitrators and parties."°  Second, reform could come from the
judiciary. Courts could essentially read in a requirement for written
opinions when interpreting arbitration rules in the context of cases
adjudicated in thejudicial forum. This is unlikely, however, given the
emphasis that courts generally place on the sanctity of the contract
negotiated between the parties."' Third, using its broad oversight
authority, the SEC could promulgate a requirement that arbitrators
write a statement of reasons. The SEC essentially has the power of
arbitrators, including businessjudgment and legal standards). Whether arbitrators should follow
a legal or commercial judgment standard, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
296. See supra notes 127-56 and accompanying text (discussing concept of meaningful
review).
297. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (discussing Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995), where Court held that arbitrators may grant
punitive damages even when state law says otherwise).
298. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (discussing need for uniformity and
predictability in decisionmaking).
299. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (arguing that published decisions are
necessary for common, uniform understanding of securities laws). This would enable arbitrators
to incorporate changes into the federal securities laws for the industry's benefit. Id.
300. See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text (discussing various reforms to arbitration
rules, including some which facilitate exchange of information).
301. See supra notes 31-72 and accompanying text (discussing courts' treatment of parties'
contracts relating to arbitration agreements).
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approval over any proposed rules, as well as the authority to mandate
the adoption of any arbitration rules it deems necessary for the
protection of parties' statutory rights." 2 Finally, Congress could
enact legislation requiring arbitrators to include written opinions.
Irrespective of which entity ultimately mandates written opinions,
the first step is to acknowledge the benefits that such a requirement
would generate. Written opinions accompanying arbitration awards
would offer many advantages for investors. Opponents of written
opinions believe that the need to preserve efficiency, maintain
qualified arbitrators, quickly resolve simple issues, and promote
confidentiality, outweigh any benefits that investors and the securities
markets would receive. But the benefits do outweigh the costs. Most
importantly, a statement of reasons would effectuate Congress' intent
behind the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, while recognizing
the Federal Arbitration Act's special policy favoring arbitration.
Moreover, a written opinion would promote meaningful review of
arbitration awards; stimulate the development of federal common law
that is uniform, consistent, and predictable; reduce bias among
arbitrators; and contribute to the securities industry's future economic
development.
302. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994) (authorizing SEC to "abrogate, add to, and delete from"
SROs' rules); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,233-34 (1987) (noting
broad authority of SEC to oversee and regulate arbitration rules); Securities Regulation in the
United States, NASD 8-9 (1992) (detailing statutory source of SEC's rulemaking power).

